‘The West should encourage India to become Russia’s Arctic alternative to China’

A conversation on India’s Arctic strategy with Anurag Bisen of the Vivekananda International Foundation

This post for 66° North marks the second instalment in our exclusive series of long-form interviews with experts, policymakers, and diplomats. Every other month, we feature in-depth conversations with influential voices shaping the future of the Arctic.

This interview features Anurag Bisen, a Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, a New Delhi–based think tank with close connections to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and the Indian government. A veteran submariner in the Indian Navy, Anurag previously served as a Senior Defence Specialist at India’s National Security Council Secretariat. He played a key role in drafting and steering the approval of India’s Arctic Policy, released by the Government of India in March 2022. A Russian speaker, Anurag regularly travels to Russia to engage in Arctic policy dialogue.

66° North: Anurag, many thanks again for agreeing to this interview. Let’s begin with the first question. You’ve just explained the close links between the Vivekananda Foundation – your current employer – and the Indian government. From your biography, I understand you served as a submariner in the Indian Navy for many years. That would give you deep familiarity with the policymaking processes within India’s Ministry of Defence and other government bodies.

My first question concerns India’s Arctic policy of 2022, which I understand you helped draft and coordinate. This document has drawn considerable interest in other parts of the world. What were the main motivations behind India’s decision to articulate a formal Arctic strategy? What interests and concerns drove the initiative?

Anurag Bisen: Thank you. I was indeed part of the government when the policy was drafted. I joined the Vivekananda Foundation only in January last year, and I retired from the Indian Navy on the last day of 2023. At the time of the policy’s development, I was on deputation to the National Security Council Secretariat, where I coordinated aspects of the Arctic policy. It was not a solo effort – it involved multiple ministries, institutions, and think tanks in a whole-of-government approach.

India has held observer status in the Arctic Council since 2013, and by mid-2020, we had been observers for seven years. During that time, our activities and interest in the Arctic increased. In 2018, China released a white paper laying out its Arctic policy. While the document was well formulated, it attracted criticism – particularly for China’s self-designation as a “near-Arctic state.” This sparked debate internationally, notably in a 2019 speech by then–U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Rovaniemi, where he rejected the concept of near-Arctic states, stressing there are only Arctic and non-Arctic states.

This sharp geopolitical focus of the U.S. raised the profile of Arctic affairs more broadly. At that point, India was one of just four observer states without a formal Arctic policy. Our only articulation of interest consisted of a short paragraph or two on the Ministry of External Affairs website. It was felt that a formal policy would help express our views, outline our strategic interests, and lend coherence to India’s engagement with the Arctic.

Beyond science and environmental concerns, we also recognised the importance of resources – hydrocarbons, rare earth elements, and other minerals – as vital components of the Arctic’s relevance to India. A formal policy would enable us to clearly communicate our interests and intentions to the world.

66° North: That’s a very clear explanation, thank you. You mentioned hydrocarbons and rare earths. I find India’s Arctic Policy notable for how it sidesteps sensitive questions around geopolitics and security. But it does include a section on economic policy. Could you outline India’s commercial interests in the Arctic?

Anurag Bisen: Certainly. The policy highlights that the opening up of the Arctic also means greater access to its resources, and India has expressed interest in those – provided they are exploited sustainably.

If I were to prioritise, hydrocarbons come first. India is the world’s second-largest importer of oil, after China. We import over 85% of our oil needs, and Russia has, over the last three years, become our largest source. In 2023, 38% of our oil imports came from Russia. The Arctic’s vast oil reserves have the potential to contribute significantly to India’s energy security.

The second area is gas. About 45% of our gas is imported, making us the world’s fourth-largest gas importer after China, Japan, and South Korea. The Arctic’s reserves could also help address this dependency.

Beyond hydrocarbons, rare earth elements are another priority. Greenland alone holds a quarter of the world’s rare earths, and there are significant deposits in Russia and Canada. As the Arctic becomes more accessible, India is exploring how to tap into these resources, including coking coal and timber – both of which we already import in large volumes from Russia.

That said, India’s policy clearly states that any engagement with Arctic resources must align with principles of sustainability. Responsible exploration and exploitation is the baseline for any Indian involvement.

66° North: Let’s turn to aspects not included in India’s Arctic policy – specifically, the geopolitical dimensions. The Arctic Policy avoids addressing these issues directly, yet India is an increasingly prominent global maritime and political actor with a well-defined security profile. How does India view the evolving security landscape in the Arctic, and did these developments influence its Arctic Policy, even if not overtly?

Anurag Bisen: Before I respond, let me add a caveat: the views I express here are my personal opinions and do not reflect the official position of the Government of India. In fact, some of what I say may not align with the government’s current stance. That said, you’re right – the policy deliberately steers clear of geopolitical and security concerns, though strategic intent is subtly embedded within it.

The second-last pillar of the policy, for instance, discusses governance and international cooperation. India expresses its commitment to promoting peace and stability in the Arctic in accordance with international law and established treaties. We explicitly uphold the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and affirm our active participation in global climate and environmental frameworks relevant to the Arctic.

At the Arctic Circle India Forum in early May, India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, was interviewed by Iceland’s former president Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. Asked a similar question, Dr Jaishankar stated that India would engage with the Arctic as it does elsewhere: by working with all stakeholders, and always in line with its national interests.

Personally, I see the Arctic today as the site of an intensifying strategic triangle involving the United States, Russia, and China. India’s two most important strategic partners – Russia and the United States – are deeply engaged in the Arctic. We have high-level strategic partnerships and conduct 2+2 dialogues with both. At the same time, China – our principal adversary – is expanding its footprint in the region. In my view, this makes Indian engagement in the Arctic essential.

India should be present to understand and navigate these dynamics. It could, I believe, position itself as a bridge – between the West and Russia, or between the West and the broader “Global South.” Later in our conversation, we can discuss how this bridging role might be developed in practice. But at its core, this is how I understand the geopolitics of the Arctic: India needs to be engaged, not only for environmental or economic reasons, but also to make sense of and influence the emerging security architecture.

66° North: Since you brought up China, I’d like to follow up. How do Indian policymakers view China’s growing involvement in the Arctic – especially from a maritime standpoint? What are the main concerns?

Anurag Bisen: The concerns go beyond the maritime domain. India and Russia share a long-standing and multifaceted relationship, but since the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014, Russia has found itself increasingly isolated. This isolation has pushed Moscow closer to Beijing – something China has capitalised on.

Take the Yamal LNG project as an example. Chinese entities such as CNPC and the Silk Road Fund hold nearly a 30% stake. Reports suggest that around 60% of the equipment used in the project is of Chinese origin, and Chinese labour has been heavily involved.

From the Indian perspective, this Sino-Russian closeness is driven less by mutual affinity and more by necessity. Many in Russia are uncomfortable with their junior position in the relationship. There are also longstanding Russian concerns about the Far East, which remains sparsely populated and vulnerable to demographic and strategic pressures from China. Historical grievances persist in Chinese strategic thinking regarding how the borders were settled.

In contrast, India presents no such challenge to Russia. In fact, Russia has actively courted Indian engagement. At the 2019 Eastern Economic Forum, India was the official partner country, and Prime Minister Modi was the chief guest. That’s when India launched its “Act Far East” policy and extended a US$1 billion line of credit to Russia.

India also enjoys strong bilateral relationships with other Arctic states. With Canada, for instance, people of Indian origin make up around 8% of the population. Despite a temporary diplomatic strain under Prime Minister Trudeau, the relationship remains robust. India has held two Nordic summits and planned a third with Norway, which was postponed due to a terror attack in Kashmir.

Strategic competition with China is a more important long-term challenge for the West than the conflict with Russia. In fact, it would not be in the West’s interest to see Russia and China close ranks in an Arctic partnership – with their forces combined, the two countries would be too strong to balance. So my argument is that Russia is being driven into China’s embrace, since it is increasingly isolated and sees no alternative because of Western sanctions. The West should encourage India to become Russia’s Arctic alternative to China.

But to be clear, India’s Arctic engagement is not driven by what China does. We do not compete with China, nor do we replicate its methods – be they economic inducements, coercion, or opaque investments. India’s engagement is transparent, based on national interest, and carried out with limited resources. China’s involvement in the Arctic is far ahead of ours, but India’s policy stands on its own merits.

66° North: It is interesting you raise the possibility of India as an Arctic “alternative” to China from a Russian point of view. I’ve also observed this argument in Russian writings. You recently took part in the International Arctic Forum in Murmansk. What’s your impression – do Russian stakeholders genuinely want deeper Arctic cooperation with India, in part to reduce reliance on China?

Anurag Bisen: Absolutely. I can give you several examples. Over the last ten years, nearly every India–Russia summit joint statement has included a line welcoming India’s participation in the Arctic. Despite that, we’ve seen limited concrete follow-up – likely due to a lack of coordination on the Indian side.

But things may be shifting. The joint statement from the 2023 summit was the most substantive yet on Arctic cooperation. It included an agreement to establish a joint working group on cooperation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Personally, I would have preferred broader wording – such as Arctic cooperation in general – but the NSR is a start.

Russia has also made strategic overtures. Last year, it offered India the opportunity to build icebreakers. That was a significant signal. China, with its dominant shipbuilding capacity, could have fulfilled that role more efficiently. But Moscow chose to publicly offer it to India – perhaps to balance its over-dependence on China.

More broadly, I argue that India and Russia are natural partners in each other’s strategic theatres. The Indian Ocean is to India what the Arctic is to Russia – vital and deeply strategic. Neither country poses a threat to the other in these regions. I’ve argued this in my writing: we should facilitate each other’s presence, rather than allow it to be constrained by external tensions.

Russian stakeholders are clearly interested. But for this potential to be realised, India must bring more cohesion and follow-through to its Arctic engagement.

66° North: You’ve spoken about India’s strong bilateral ties with all Arctic Council states, and about its status as an observer since 2013 – the same year China was admitted. How does India currently assess the state of the Arctic Council, especially in light of the Norwegian presidency’s recent efforts to revive cooperation? And what is India’s perspective on Russia’s suggestions to explore alternative governance mechanisms, perhaps under the BRICS+ format?

Anurag Bisen: Credit must be given to Norway for attempting to revive the Arctic Council’s functions. Through virtual working group meetings, the Norwegians have managed to restore a semblance of cooperation – but it remains limited.

This is despite the 2017 binding agreement among Arctic states to enhance scientific cooperation. Currently, nearly half of the INTERACT climate monitoring stations are located in the Russian Arctic. Since 2022, the absence of Russian data has led to discrepancies. Scientists are unsure whether these are caused by gaps in data or actual shifts due to climate change. Either way, this impairs climate research with global ramifications.

In my view, at the very least, scientific cooperation should be restored immediately. Even in the United States, there are now voices calling for the resumption of this area of collaboration. When Kenneth Høegh from the Danish-Greenlandic presidency visited Delhi in May and outlined their five priorities, I asked him directly: if Russia accounts for more of the Arctic than the other seven members combined, how can these goals be met without its participation?

Arctic Council cooperation should focus on sustainable development and climate change, not be paralysed by geopolitics. If politics cannot be kept separate, then the Council’s mandate should be revised to reflect that. But under the current charter, we should strive to resume practical collaboration, especially scientific.

Looking ahead, if a political settlement emerges between Russia and Ukraine – or if a potential Trump administration pursues rapprochement – this could unlock renewed cooperation in the Arctic. The future of the Council hinges significantly on U.S.–Russia relations.

As for India, we’ve long prioritised the Arctic Council in our official policy. But with the Council currently constrained, we’ve shifted towards bilateral engagements. Since 2021, India has signed Arctic-related agreements with Norway and Russia and is on the verge of signing one with Finland. These are led by our National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR) in Goa.

On the question of alternative governance platforms such as BRICS+: I have a somewhat contrarian view. If, as the often-cited phrase goes, “what happens in the Arctic affects the entire planet,” then the rest of the world – especially the “Global South” – deserves a more meaningful role in Arctic affairs. I’m not advocating for territorial claims, but rather for a more inclusive governance framework.

To illustrate, consider India’s climate-linked interests. India and China together represent nearly half of humanity. One critical issue is the monsoon. Around 70% of India’s annual rainfall occurs between June and September. Nearly 60% of our farmland is rain-fed, not irrigated, and monsoon performance is directly tied to India’s GDP and food security.

Studies have shown a teleconnection between Arctic climate dynamics and the Indian monsoon. Yet under current Arctic Council rules, if India wants to research this, we must partner with a Council member, and we cannot contribute more than 50% of the resources. But why would an Arctic state be invested in researching the Indian monsoon? This reveals a structural limitation.

Another example is sea level rise. India’s extensive coastline and vulnerable coastal cities make us acutely exposed. Yet our participation in Arctic climate research remains constrained by current governance structures.

In that light, I believe additional research platforms should be welcomed. Russia has offered to host a BRICS+ scientific research station in Svalbard. In my view, the more opportunities for scientific collaboration, the better.

Among BRICS+ members, China and India are the only ones with significant polar interests – Brazil to a lesser extent. But this initiative could still play a role in democratising Arctic science. I support India’s involvement in such efforts, provided they promote stability and transparency.

Finally, there’s also a legal argument for more inclusive research governance. The Svalbard Treaty contains a provision that calls for an international convention to regulate scientific activity in the region. I’ve argued, including in a paper for India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, that we need an ATCM-style framework for this – similar to what exists in Antarctica. India, as a self-proclaimed voice of the “Global South”, should push for such mechanisms.

So, to summarise: as long as alternative platforms foster scientific research and stability without exacerbating geopolitical tensions, India should participate – and in fact, should take a leading role in building them.

66° North: Thank you, Anurag. I’d like to turn now to India’s maritime interests in the Arctic. You’ve spoken about cooperation with Russia and the associated opportunities – but what about the risks? India operates a vast network of ports and has growing shipping interests. How does it view the possible year-round opening of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Russia’s broader Arctic infrastructure ambitions?

Anurag Bisen: Connectivity is a key pillar of India’s Arctic policy, and we have explicitly referenced not only the NSR, but also the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and Russia’s Unified Deep Water System (UDWS).

For context, the UDWS carries around three-quarters of Russia’s internal cargo and connects major maritime zones – the Black, Baltic, and White Seas – with inland waterways. It’s designed for a depth of 4.5 metres and guarantees navigability to 3 metres. This makes it integral to Russia’s internal Arctic access.

Now, the NSR itself is not of direct commercial benefit to India. If you look at the map, India lies directly south of the Arctic. Whether we send cargo through the Suez Canal to Russia’s western ports or via the east to the Russian Far East, the distances are comparable. In contrast, the NSR offers a clear benefit to ports in northern China, Japan, and South Korea.

That said, India has two connectivity projects that can provide viable Arctic access. The first is the INSTC, which runs from the Indian subcontinent through Iran and into Russia. Studies have shown that this route is up to 30% cheaper and 40% faster than the conventional Suez route. The second is the Eastern Maritime Corridor – also known as the Chennai–Vladivostok route – which links India to Russia’s Pacific coast.

These two corridors anchor either end of what Rosatom has termed the “Greater NSR” – extending from St Petersburg to Vladivostok. So, although the NSR may not be transformative for Indian shipping, these broader interlinked corridors could open up new strategic and economic opportunities.

Energy remains a major driver. In 2023, India sourced 38% of its oil from Russia. Most of that supply comes from Russia’s western ports, like Primorsk and Ust-Luga. Similarly, our major refineries are concentrated on India’s western seaboard. But over the next two decades, we may see greater relevance for the Eastern Maritime Corridor – particularly for liquefied natural gas (LNG), metallurgical coal, and timber.

However, there are challenges. The first is the fear of Western sanctions. India has about $15 billion invested in Russian hydrocarbon projects – our largest such investment globally. Although there’s long been talk of India acquiring a stake in Arctic LNG 2, Indian oil companies are wary of running afoul of Western restrictions. Unless some form of sovereign guarantee is offered, investments will remain cautious.

Second, there’s the language and systemic barrier. India’s trade systems are more harmonised with the West, and Russian business processes can be more difficult to navigate. Third, there’s the absence of a robust trade settlement mechanism. Despite decades of strong political ties, India–Russia trade has lagged. Our 2022 trade target was just $25 billion, in stark contrast to Russia–China trade at over $250 billion.

So, while the opportunities are real, execution will require structural fixes on both sides – particularly in trade facilitation and financial risk mitigation.

66° North: Thank you. You touched on sanctions and other impediments, which brings me to another issue – Russian raw diamonds. India, especially Gujarat, has long been a major buyer. But with the G7 moving to ban Russian diamond imports, how is India approaching this politically and commercially?

Anurag Bisen: That’s an important question. India is the world’s largest processor of diamonds. Around 90% of the world’s diamond cutting and polishing takes place in India. In 2023, we exported approximately $21 billion worth of cut and polished diamonds, making it our third-largest export category.

However, when you look at our export destinations, Russia is not among the top five. Our biggest markets are the United States (about $8 billion), followed by Hong Kong, Belgium, the UAE, and Israel. On the import side, India is the world’s third-largest importer of rough diamonds. Our major suppliers are the UAE, Belgium, Hong Kong, Angola, and Botswana – not Russia.

This means that, surprisingly, the G7’s ban on Russian diamonds may not affect us as much as people think. That said, I have long argued that we should source more rough diamonds directly from ALROSA, Russia’s state-owned diamond producer, rather than through intermediaries.

There are mixed assessments of the ban’s impact. Some believe it will significantly disrupt India’s diamond sector; others argue that alternative supply chains can cushion the blow. What is clear is that the government is taking it seriously. Prime Minister Modi has raised the issue directly with the Belgian Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister Jaishankar has also been active on this front.

Unlike the G7 or EU states – where diamond processing is not a major source of employment – in India, it’s a livelihood issue. Hundreds of thousands of workers in Gujarat depend on this trade. So our approach has to be different. The government is actively pursuing a solution that protects both trade flows and employment.

66° North: That’s a helpful explanation – thank you. One last question. India and Russia were reportedly close to signing a Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS), which would have included Arctic port access for the Indian Navy. Ultimately, it wasn’t signed. What were India’s strategic goals behind this agreement, and why do you think it stalled?

Anurag Bisen: That’s a tough one. I won’t speculate too much about why it wasn’t signed. But India has already concluded logistics support agreements with several countries: the United States, Japan, Australia, France, Singapore, South Korea, the UK, and Vietnam. So we are not new to such arrangements.

A RELOS with Russia has been under discussion since 2019. It was on the agenda during our Defence Minister’s visit to Moscow that year and again during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the Eastern Economic Forum. The Indian media had widely expected it to be signed in 2023, and there were even reports it might be signed during a reciprocal Russian visit to India. Perhaps that could still happen – especially if President Putin visits India this year.

As a former naval officer, I believe the Indian Navy would benefit significantly. The agreement would grant us access to Russian Arctic ports and allow for logistical support. In return, Russia would gain access to Indian facilities in the Indian Ocean – a region vital to its long-term trade and naval reach. It’s a win–win proposition.

I don’t see any insurmountable obstacles to signing it. My hope is that we will still see the agreement finalised in the near future.

This is a reproduction of an article that first appeared on 66° North. If you would like to read more posts by Lukas Wahden, you can sign up for his blog on Substack here.
 
Please note: The views and opinions expressed in this interview are those of the Anurag Bisen alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the editorial staff of 66° North, or the Government of India.