Will more ships run aground on the Northwest Passage as traffic increases?

MV Thamesborg is the latest cargo ship to run aground on the Northwest Passage. Given the lack of charted water in the Canadian Arctic, it’s surprising that more vessels haven’t gotten into difficulties.

On Sept. 6, the Canadian Coast Guard reported that the MV Thamesborg had gone aground in Franklin Strait, a major channels for the Northwest Passage. The Thamesborg is one of Royal Wagenborg’s four T class cargo ships. Sailing under the Dutch flag, she was carrying a cargo of carbon anodes for the aluminum smelter at Baie Comeau in the province of Quebec.

The ship stranded at the western tip of the Tasmania Islands, a group of rocky islets on the eastern side of Franklin Strait. One report said the ship was on a rock pinnacle and that five ballast tanks had been damaged; there was no pollution and no injuries. The Thamesborg was eventually refloated on Oct. 9, following an unsuccessful attempt to get her off the rocks the previous day.

At the turn of the century, there really wasn’t that much traffic in the NWP. That began to change in about 2008, and by 2023 there were 13 commercial transits, 11 expedition vessels and the usual flock of yachts and small craft. The NWP represents only a fraction of actual Canadian Arctic activity, community and mining resupply, as well as mineral shipments make up the bulk of marine movements.

While ships do, very occasionally, find bottom in the Canadian Arctic, what is unusual is the location of this grounding. We will have to await the conclusions of the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) inquiry for a detailed assessment, and particularly to know why the ship was so far off the usual deep-water track through Franklin Strait. For example, the Nordic Orion safely transited the strait in 2013 with 73,500 tons coal at 14 meter draft (the maximum depth of an part of the vessel).

This isn’t to say that the Canadian Arctic is without hazards. A decade ago, the Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS) reported that only 10% of the Arctic was surveyed to modern standards. By 2023, around 16% of Arctic waters were adequately surveyed.

The author (on behalf of GNWT and GN) presented a paper at the Canadian Hydrographic Congress (CHC) in 2012 that identified systematic deficiencies in Arctic charting. Two years later, Canada’s Auditor General issued a damning report on the same issue.

Here is an extract from the 2012 paper:

The CHS catalogue has “946 charts covering all four of Canada’s coastlines plus major inland waterways”.  The current Arctic catalogue (2008) lists 179 charts, or 19% of all charts, however note the distribution of charts in Table 1 below.

(At the time, I was only able to identify 898 charts including small boat and inland waterways. Major lakes were Lake Athabasca, Great Slave Lake and Great Bear Lake).

This is how the CHS depicted its Arctic chart catalogue in 2010:

Fig. 1 CHS Representation of areas in the Canadian Arctic that are surveyed to modern standards

There have been other groundings by ships in the NWP, but these are very infrequent and in recent years almost all by expedition passenger ships visiting locations off the recognized transit routes.

An exception was the Hanseatic on Aug. 29, 1996, which was on a normal sailing route when it ran aground. Here it was found that despite the crew being aware that the usual shoal markers had not been placed that season, the ship depended on a marker that had survived winter ice and was displaced by 200 meters

Another grounding was the Clipper Adventurer in 2010 that stranded on a seamount that had only been discovered in 2007. The chart revision was subject to a Notice to Shipping (NOTSHIP), but this was not on board the ship. The route being followed by the ship from Port Epworth to get back onto the NWP track had last been surveyed in 1965 with spot soundings.

Fig. 2 chart extract showing location of grounding

The same year the tanker Nanny stranded on a sandbar while exiting Gjoa Haven on Sept. 1. It was able to get free after lightering some fuel cargo to another tanker. Although the TSB decided not to investigate after interviewing the crew, the grounding can, in large part, be ascribed to three things: poor charts for the area, the master not being familiar with the waters, and also not having his own notes as to safe approach and anchorage.

Here is a list of known recent groundings in the Canadian Arctic. Many of these incidents were “touch and go” and didn’t result in damage. The TSB classifies these incidents as “bottom contact.”

However, there are all sorts of unidentified underwater peaks awaiting the unwary. For example, even where a consistent survey has been undertaken, line spacings of 1 and 2 kilometers are common and 6 kilometers is not unknown.

Charting has not kept up with traffic growth, and here is how charting of the Arctic compares with Canada’s other coastlines. This table is also from the 2012 paper to the CHC. It was based on the author’s estimate of deep draft navigation charts and excluded general (1:1,000,000 or smaller scale charts), small craft and inland lakes charts.

Given the parlous nature of the Canadian Arctic chart catalogue, it is a testament to the inherent caution of Arctic navigators that there have not been more groundings.

Any opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arctic Today.

Christopher Wright is the former president of The Mariport Group Ltd, a marine and port consulting company that he formed in 1989. After retiring in 2013, Wright joined WorleyParsons Canada (now Advisian) as a marine logistics specialist.

He has written two books: “Arctic Cargo; A History of Marine Transportation in Canada’s North” (2016) and “Of Penguins and Polar Bears, a History of Coldwater Cruising” (2020).