Why an international icebreaker pact is still a work in progress
The agreement, signed during the Biden Administration, overlaps with – but is separate from – the Trump Administration’s own efforts. Confusion results.
On July 11, 2024, alongside the NATO Summit, then-U.S. President Biden, Finland’s President Stubb, and then-Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau released a joint statement announcing something called the ICE (Icebreaker Collaboration Effort) Pact:
Through ICE Pact, our governments will build on our longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties. As the first initiative under ICE Pact, we will commit to a collaborative effort to continue building best-in-class Arctic and polar icebreakers and other Arctic and polar capabilities in each of our respective countries by sharing expertise, information, and capabilities. Over the next six months, we also will jointly develop an implementation plan for this collaboration to build these highly complex and critical vessels for our allies and partners with interests and responsibilities in the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
This partnership will strengthen the shipbuilding industries in each nation with the goal of creating good-paying jobs in shipyards, marine equipment manufacturers, and many other related services across all three countries. In the Arctic, new, faster shipping lanes hold the potential to create new economic opportunities and drive down shipping costs. And in the Antarctic, our partnership can also foster increased scientific research and international collaboration.
Just over one year later, many seem confused about what the ICE Pact is supposed to do. Justin Katz writes about this confusion in his excellent article:
Experts and analysts told Breaking Defense that one year since the ICE Pact’s announcement, and despite Trump’s clear support for a robust icebreaker fleet, the administration’s own talk of the specifics of the plan, not to mention the president’s open threats against one of its two partners, has called the future of the joint initiative into question, at least in its current form.
The article assesses that this confusion comes primarily from two issues:
The confusion around ICE Pact’s future stems from two issues, experts told Breaking Defense. The first factor was the vague path set out by the previous administration concerning the agreement’s end goals. The second issue is the current White House’s muddled messaging on its apparent desire to acquire icebreakers directly from Finland juxtapose with aggressively posturing towards Canada.
I think that Justin is generally right, but I’d phrase it differently. To me, the confusion results from three main issues:
- Confusion of the Trump administration’s long term effort to acquire icebreakers (dating back to the first term) with the ICE Pact,
- Unrealistic expectations of a modest agreement driven by the Biden administration’s statements about the ICE Pact, and
- A lack of knowledge of Canada’s shipbuilding programs and needs.
To shed some light on the first two, items, I will briefly recount actions concerning U.S. icebreaker acquisition from the first Trump administration to the present.
The First Trump Administration and Great Power Competition
The first Trump Administration notably focused its National Security Strategy on ‘Great Power Competition’ with Russia and China. Subsequent Arctic strategies noted that Russia was increasingly using the Northern Sea Route and that China was building up its own polar fleet. China’s first domestically produced (but foreign designed) polar research vessel, Xue Long 2, was completed in July of 2019 after about 2.5 years of construction. Russian icebreaker construction continued apace.
Domestically, the U.S. Coast Guard’s own analysis emphasized that it needed at least six polar icebreakers to perform all of its required missions. But it only had two operational polar icebreakers — the Polar Star and Healy.
Polar Star, the only ‘heavy’ icebreaker, seemed to be on its last legs. During the 2017-2018 Operation Deep Freeze, in which Polar Star clears a path for the resupply of McMurdo Station in Antarctica, she experienced both engine trouble and flooding. During the 2018-2019 mission, she experienced electrical system problems, a fire, and a shaft seal leak. When not conducting Operation Deep Freeze, Polar Star spends nearly all of her time undergoing maintenance and therefore is not regularly available for Arctic operations.
Healy, the U.S. Coast Guard’s ‘medium’ icebreaker, remained focused on supporting scientific research. In 2020, a propulsion motor fire cut short her summer Arctic patrol. Fortunately, there was a spare propulsion motor (acquired when the ship was built) available, enabling a timely repair. More mechanical problems seemed likely as Healy approached 2030, the end of her planned thirty-year service life.
An icebreaker acquisition program was at long last underway. The Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program (which began as the Heavy Icebreaker Program) was first funded in 2013. But higher budget priorities delayed full funding— and planned construction start— until FY20. When the contract for the first PSC was finally awarded in 2019, the first vessel— which would replace the ailing Polar Star— was scheduled for delivery in 2024. Growth in the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaking fleet would have to wait for the second vessel’s expected arrival in 2026. Additional vessels would then be delivered every two years. With Healy reaching her 30-year service life in 2030, it was clear that even under the most positive of assumptions the U.S. Coast Guard was more than a decade away from reaching the required six vessels without additional action.
The Trump White House did not accept the best-case timeline for the PSCs provided by the U.S. Coast Guard and began seeking both short and medium term solutions to fill the resulting icebreaker gap. This program became public when the White House published its Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions in July of 2020. The applicable to acquiring additional icebreakers from foreign sources read (emphasis mine):
(c) In the interest of securing a fully capable polar security icebreaking fleet that is capable of providing a persistent presence in the Arctic and Antarctic regions at the lowest possible cost, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security in identifying viable polar security icebreaker leasing options, provided by partner nations, as a near- to mid-term (Fiscal Years 2022-2029) bridging strategy to mitigate future operational degradation of the USCGC POLAR STAR. Leasing options shall contemplate capabilities that allow for access to the Arctic and Antarctic regions to, as appropriate, conduct national and economic security missions, in addition to marine scientific research in the Arctic, and conduct research in Antarctica in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty System. Further, and in advance of any bid solicitation for future polar security icebreaker acquisitions, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify partner nations with proven foreign shipbuilding capability and expertise in icebreaker construction.
The effort actually began about a year earlier. As the U.S. Naval Attaché to Finland at the time, I worked with a team at the embassy to gather information, write reports, and answer many questions about Finnish icebreakers and the ability of Finnish shipyards to design and build suitable icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Department of State tasking went to every embassy. After receiving all of the information, the White House and National Security Council focused on Finland. I never saw other responses, but assumed at the time that the NSC assessed that Finland offered the best solution.
What eventually developed was a plan to buy or lease icebreakers for the short term. The options included the U.S.-built Aiviq and the Finnish multi-purpose icebreakers Nordica and Fennica. Those involved in assessing the vessels believed that the Finnish vessels were better suited, but that any deal would involve Aiviq simply because she was built in the USA.
For the medium term, the Trump Administration planned to purchase newly-built icebreakers from Finland. This was definitely a possibility, as the companies involved in discussions had both the technical capability and the necessary space in their ‘order book’ to immediately begin work on these vessels. There were even plans to work with U.S. ship designers and builders in order to prepare them to build later vessels of the same type. Based on the discussed timelines, Finnish shipyards could have delivered at least two icebreakers to the U.S. Coast Guard by now, if this option had been pursued.
President Trump spoke of this initiative during a July 10, 2020 speech at U.S. Southern Command (around 7:05):
And we’re going to be trying to get, if we can, an extra 10 icebreakers. We only have one. Russia has 40; we have one. So we will have 2, but we think we’ll have 10 because we’re trying to do a deal with a certain place that has a lot of icebreakers, and we’re seeing if we can make a really good deal where you can have them very fast. You know about that. We’re working on it, and I think we can surprise you – at a very good price, which will be nice. Much cheaper than the one we’re building, and that’s also nice. You could do about five of them.
The Trump administration simply ran out of time on these initiatives. No deals were signed before President Trump left office, and both were dropped early in the Biden administration. This was partly due to internal opposition from senior members of the U.S. Coast Guard. I found it telling that none of the work we did at the embassy- none of the reports we wrote- ever made it into an official U.S. Coast Guard report or Congressional testimony. I’ve continued to hear, at least until recently, senior U.S. Coast Guard officials state that Finnish shipyards can’t build the types of vessels that the U.S. Coast Guard needs (which is obviously false).
The Biden Administration
In December of 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard awarded VT Halter a contract to build the second PSC. For more information on this troubled program, see here: Don’t Double Down on the Polar Security Cutter
For more on the troubled history of Aiviq/Storis, see here: The U.S. Coast Guard Needs Non-Military Icebreakers. That includes Aiviq.
The ICE Pact
When it was first announced in July of 2024, I thought that this would be a continuation of the first Trump administration’s attempts to acquire icebreakers in the short and medium term. The addition of Canada seemed natural as Canadian shipbuilder Davie purchased Helsinki Shipyard in November of 2023. Canada was beginning to renew its own icebreaker fleet and could also use assistance.
As the initiative came from a Democrat administration, I hoped that this signaled bi-partisan consensus for working with our allies and partners to acquire icebreakers in a relevant timeframe.
But that’s not how the Biden Administration described it.
Daleep Singh, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council in the Biden Administration said the following on a Bloomberg podcast in August of 2024 (emphasis mine):
And the deal we announced at NATO is for Finland and Canada to share their expertise with us and make investments in US shipyards to grow our collective production capacity to build icebreakers. And what do they get? Well in exchange, we agree to integrate our icebreaking supply chains so that they are interoperable at every stage of production….
In terms of the numbers, we’re actually working on an MOU. I can’t give you the exact numbers, but I mean, I would go back to the global order book that I mentioned. There are 70 to 90 icebreakers that the likes of India and Brazil and Argentina and Chile and Sweden, many countries want icebreakers. We want to be their supplier of choice. All three of our countries do. And so instead of building two icebreakers in the past 50 years, we want to capture, let’s say 10, 20, 30 icebreakers of demand over the next decade. And you can only have the kind of investments and workforce development that I’m describing if you have that sort of demand signal.
This made no sense to me, as I wrote in September:
The Biden Administration’s plan … is for the USA to leverage the expertise of its allies (Finland and Canada) in order to make U.S. shipyards more competitive in icebreaker design and construction in order to attract additional private investment. The U.S. shipyards will then compete head-to-head with Finland and Canada in this niche market. This can only make sense if the global orderbook for icebreakers and ice capable ships reaches the numbers cited by Mr. Singh in similar enough types to take advantage of economies of scale. If you take a closer look at the numbers, it simply doesn’t add up.
I looked at all of the projected icebreaker orders coming up in the next twenty years or so and asked other experts in the field to do the same. In the absence of a rebirth of Arctic oil and gas exploration in the West, we came up with a total of 54 icebreakers planned (24 of these for Canada). And my colleagues and I couldn’t see how the U.S. could compete to build these vessels:
We already know where most of them will be built. As icebreakers are normally custom-built vessels (with the exception of the icebreaker classes for the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards such as the Canada’s six planned program icebreakers), this leaves little room for U.S. shipyards to acquire new business and take advantage of economies of scale. There are also EU procurement rules. Although I’m not an expert, I believe they favor the use of EU shipyards especially when competing against nations which have protectionist shipbuilding laws.
And there is worldwide capacity to build more icebreakers. For example, Helsinki Shipyard has openings in its order book1. This shipyard, and others in Finland, can build icebreakers faster and cheaper than those in North America.
For my full analysis (including a breakdown of the 54 planned icebreakers), see here: ICE Pact Update
With so much other work to do in shipbuilding, the idea of U.S. shipbuilders out-competing their Finnish counterparts and overcoming national programs (that prefer local employees) never made sense. As Breaking Defense quoted me:
Rybski said ICE Pact provided “a good opportunity for folks to meet and talk,” noting the dialogue taking place between the US Coast Guard and some foreign shipbuilders. “But as far as the vision the [White House National Security Council] put forward last year about bringing ice breaking technology home to the US, and revitalizing the shipbuilding industry by building icebreakers for the world and the United States, that never seemed to me to be a plausible or realistic argument. And I think that’s bearing itself out pretty clearly.”
The Memorandum of Understanding
The ICE Pact Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in November 2024 and publicly released in December. The MOU is linked above, you can read it fairly quickly. My summary: a non-binding agreement between the governments of the USA, Canada, and Finland to facilitate technical cooperation and information exchange concerning the construction of icebreakers. Trilateral meetings of various sorts have taken place in all three nations, sometimes bringing together experts and at other times government officials. Similar meetings took place before the ICE Pact, but more than one participant tells me that the post-ICE Pact have a more serious feel to them.
Although the MOU does not exclude the Biden administration’s vision, it doesn’t support it. Back in Finland, government officials were singing an entirely different tune.
How the Finns See the Ice Pact
After signing the MOU, Finland’s Minister of Economic Affairs Wille Rydman gave an interview to the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in which he stated he believed the ICE Pact would result in Finnish shipyards building icebreakers for the USA and Canada because:
They haven’t had credible icebreaker construction for decades. They have lost that know-how and expertise. Given the urgency of the matter, the United States and Canada have no other ally with the rapid capacity and ability to provide solutions to their shortage of icebreakers.
In the same interview, this is how Rydman described the ICE Pact:
The new agreement does not contain any concrete projects and does not bind the countries or their companies to anything.
And it wasn’t just Rydman. As I wrote in December:
Over the past couple of months, I’ve spoken with several Finns involved in the ICE Pact. All of them are or were somehow involved in Finland’s icebreaker industry and have a good appreciation for the global icebreaker market. Each and every one of them stated plainly that Finland’s goal is to build icebreakers for the United States in Finland. Although they understand that this goal will not be achieved through the ICE Pact as currently written, they see no other way for the United States to acquire the icebreakers needed to meet its security needs.
For a full look at how Finland sees the ICE pact, see here: How Finland Views the ICE Pact
The Second Trump Administration
As the second Trump Administration began, the U.S. Coast Guard’s situation was not appreciably different from the end of his first term— the only two operational polar icebreakers were still Polar Star and Healy.
Healy suffered another fire while at sea and had to cut short its 2024 Arctic Patrol. The first Polar Security Cutter is (still) at least five years away. The one addition was the purchase of Aiviq, an 2012 built commercial icebreaker that no one else wanted. Renamed Storis, the vessel is now painted U.S. Coast Guard colors and recently began patrolling near Alaska this summer.
Meanwhile, China delivered two domestically built polar research vessels in 2024, Tan Suo San Hao (PC 4) and Ji Di (PC 6). Russia delivered three nuclear-powered icebreakers (Sibir (2021), Ural (2022), and Yakutiya (2024)). Russia has four more nuclear-powered icebreakers under construction, and Ivan Papanin, the lead vessel of Russia’s so-called “combat icebreaker” class, underwent ice trials in April of this year.
From my perspective, it seems that the second Trump Administration picked up where the first one left off— looking to Finland for icebreakers to fill the immediate need while the U.S. works to build its own vessels.
The ICE Pact continues to exist, conducting meetings and facilitating cooperation between U.S., Canadian, and Finnish firms. One positive result of the ICE Pact may be that U.S. Coast Guard officials involved are now directly familiar with foreign capabilities and far less resistant to foreign acquisition of vessels.
A Note on Canada
The Breaking Defense article suggests that Canada was meant to be a source of icebreaking expertise:
But Biden also talked about revitalizing the domestic shipbuilding industry by bringing home Canadian and Finnish expertise for the benefit of American shipyards. The Trump administration reiterated those messages in June following a two-day summit among ICE Pact’s participants.
The ICE Pact, as defined in the MOU, is essentially a forum to share best practices and cooperate on worker training, supply chains, and the like.
Canada’s shipyards were already doing this with Finnish firms as they began to revitalize their icebreaking fleet. This topic is worthy of its own post, but I’ll try to summarize here:
Canada has a National Shipbuilding Strategy that dates back to 2010. Under the current iteration of the plan, Seaspan (of Vancouver) and Davie (of Quebec) will build 24 icebreakers for the Canadian Coast Guard in the coming years.
- 2 x PC2 Polar Icebreakers: 2 (one each Seaspan and Davie)
- 16 x PC4 Multi-Purpose Icebreaker: (Seaspan)
- 6 x Program Icebreakers (Davie)
This shipbuilding program will give Canada significant Arctic capability. It will also keep Seaspan and Davie fully booked for the foreseeable future, even without delays. And some delays are likely. For example, the current iteration of the Polar Icebreaker program goes back to 2008. Reading a Canadian report on the matter makes the PSC seem not-so-bad by comparison.
Another recent example is the Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel (OOSV) CCGS Naalak Nappaaluk. Originally scheduled to cost $109 Million (Canadian) and be delivered in 2017, the PC 6 research vessel is now expected to cost $1.28 Billion (Canadian). It began sea trials last month with delivery expected later this year.
Recognizing their expertise, Canadian companies have been working very closely with Finnish suppliers and designers on the coming ships. Seaspan’s Polar Icebreaker design involved two Finnish companies, Aker Arctic and Elomatic. In addition, Finnish equipment manufacturers will supply major components including the Azipods, bow thrusters, diesel engines, and centerline shafting for the vessel. Finnish designers and suppliers are also heavily involved in Seaspan’s Multi-Purpose Icebreaker.
As for Davie, well, they bought Helsinki Shipyard in November of 2023. Davie will build 30% of its Polar Icebreaker in Finland in an effort to deliver the vessel early. Shipbuilders from Quebec will work alongside their Finnish counterpart in order to gain valuable experience for Davie’s next Canadian project, the Program Icebreakers. Davie fully intends to break the cycle of ships coming in late and over budget.
Recent Deals
Just this year we have several commercial deals involving two or more of the ICE Pact nations.
James Davies, President & CEO of Davie, said: “We share a vision with Gulf Copper to make Texas a world-class hub for American icebreaker and complex ship production. Texas is ready to lead a new Golden Age of American shipbuilding – backed by our commitment to deliver ships on time, on budget and in service of national security priorities.”
Davie will not comment on ongoing negotiations, but it seems likely it is positioning itself to build vessels for the U.S. Coast Guard. Construction of the first vessels would be in Finland, shifting to Texas as the yard there becomes ready.
Finnish and Canadian Firms Team Up to Offer Arctic Security Cutters to U.S. Coast Guard
Summary: Finnish shipyard Rauma Marine Constructions (RMC) teams up with Canada’s Seaspan and Finnish design firm Aker Arctic to compete to build Arctic Security Cutters. According to the plan, Seaspan would license its Multi-Purpose Icebreaker design so that RMC could build two MPIs for the U.S. Coast Guard, training U.S. workers along the way. Construction would eventually shift to an unnamed U.S. shipyard.
Canadian Shipbuilder Davie Buys Another Finnish Shipyard
Davie buys a small, struggling Finnish shipyard that has a steel production facility. This gives Davie more control over its supply chain.
Thoughts and Comments
The Trump Administration is continuing its first-term efforts to acquire necessary icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard. Based on information acquired during the first Trump term, the emphasis is on Finland.
This is separate from the ICE Pact. The ICE Pact is designed to provide a useful “framework for continuous and ongoing collaboration among the Participants to collectively increase the capacity to design, produce, and maintain arctic and polar icebreakers.” Many organizations seemed to suggest that it was something more, including senior members of the Biden administration.
The Biden Administration’s articulation of the ICE Pact’s potential to revitalize the U.S. Shipbuilding industry was unrealistic and seemed based on false assumptions about the global icebreaker market.
Canada already has a plan that will keep its shipyards building icebreakers for the next couple of decades. Canadian firms were already working closely with Finnish designers and suppliers to improve their future projects. The most obvious example of this is Davie’s purchase of Helsinki Shipyard, but it is also important to note that Seaspan has been working with two Finnish design firms and many Finnish suppliers.
So is the ICE Pact necessary for future cooperation with Finland and Canada on icebreakers? No. The Trump Administration’s drive to get more icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard is likely still the most important factor. Davie was already planning a U.S. investment when the ICE Pact was first announced. Commercial deals seem to be driving the industry in response to demand signals from the U.S. Coast Guard, and would likely continue without the ICE Pact.
Should the ICE Pact meetings and framework be abandoned? No. As I reported above, the meetings serve as a way to increase awareness of opportunities that can lead to commercial deals. These deals, like the ones recently announced, are better termed ‘facilitated by the ICE Pact’ rather than ‘under the ICE Pact.’
But that’s just my opinion. Let me know if you agree.
Lots more to come in the coming weeks, including my long-planned European update.
Until next time-
All the Best,
PGR
