The U.S. cannot go it alone in the Arctic
I’ve spent a lot of time on Greenland — both as DASD* and earlier in my Air Force career, back when Pituffik was Thule, the U.S. had no consulate, and the Air Force was effectively the U.S. diplomatic presence.
First, a word of thanks to the U.S and allied service members who serve there. It’s a hardship tour (no families) operating 24/7 to provide early warning of threats to the U.S. and our allies. Those serving in Greenland have deep respect for the local community. In fact, they just wrapped up the 66th Operation Santa Claus — where American, Danish, and Canadian forces save all year to deliver Christmas gifts (and even dog food for sled teams) to families in northern Greenland.
It’s great that Greenland is receiving deserved attention for its strategic location, but a few points warrant clarification:
- History matters. Greenland’s relationship with the U.S. is not uncomplicated. During the Cold War, we built bases and infrastructure — sometimes without asking — which creatied a trust deficit that lasted half a century. Over the past few decades, we’ve worked deliberately to rebuild that trust through consultation and transparency. That progress should not be taken for granted. This points are also relevant:
- We have what we need. The 1951 defense agreement with Denmark gives the U.S. broad latitude to expand its military footprint and capabilities in Greenland.
- Russia and China. China showed strong investment interest, but allied coordination limited much of it. Where Russia and China are more militarily active (together) is off the coast of Alaska.
- Denmark is investing. $13.7 billion on F35s, icebreakers, drones, and infrastructure — all for Arctic security.
- Strategic ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity is a phrase we’ve been hearing in places like Venezuela and Taiwan. This concept can be useful when deterring an adversary. It is far less useful when applied to allies and partners whose cooperation we rely on every day.
- Hard reality. The U.S. simply cannot go it alone in the Arctic. That might be feasible in other parts of the globe, but the Arctic by its nature – the elements, the operating conditions, and the geography – forces compromise.
- Access and Basing. Did you see that interdiction of the Russian shadow fleet vessel in the North Atlantic a few days ago? Know how we got there? By relying on U.K. territory. That kind of access doesn’t happen by accident.
We are incredibly fortunate that in recent years (largely in response to Russia’s Ukraine invasion) Arctic allies have given the U.S. military access. This access isn’t “granted” by the military; it’s granted by domestic populations who are comfortable with the U.S. operating on their soil. That depends on trust.
Just look at a map. In the Arctic region, access and basing are the U.S. strategic advantage. Misapplied strategic ambiguity jeopardizes the very advantages we most need for our own security.
(Image: select Arctic region allies where the U.S has military access)
* Deputy Assistant Security of Defense for Arctic and Global Resilience.
This article is based on a recent LinkedIn post. Any opinions expressed in it are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arctic Today.
Iris Ferguson is President and Founder of IAF Strategies, a company that helps leaders navigate energy, Arctic, and national security risks.