Passing the gavel: Arctic politics in May
Greenland steps up, America spies, Russia’s Arctic population opines
In the vaults of the Arctic Council Secretariat in Tromsø lies a foam-lined metal case containing a special artefact: a gavel made of polished birch, its handle and head adorned with carved animal figures. The carvings reflect the totemic style of the Indigenous peoples of Canada’s northwestern Pacific territories.
In 2013, the gavel was presented to the Arctic Council by the Canadian government at a formal dinner marking the beginning of Ottawa’s second term in the Council’s rotating chairmanship. Since then, it has been used by the Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) to preside over meetings.
A token of responsibility more than a source of actual authority, the gavel has nonetheless come to symbolise the political significance of the Arctic Council chairmanship. While the role does not confer formal power, it offers holders the privilege of shaping the agenda and the opportunity to promote national priorities for the Arctic.
More importantly, however, the gavel has also prominently figured in historical photo-ops, often to signal Arctic unity in times of escalating geopolitical tension. In May 2021, for instance, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and his then Icelandic counterpart, Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, beamed into the cameras while letting the gavel pass between their hands. The snapshot marked the official commencement of Russia’s two-year period at the Council’s helm.
While Guðlaugur and Lavrov toasted with champagne, however, the Russian Armed Forces were already busy amassing thousands of soldiers and military equipment near the Russian-Ukrainian border. According to a much-cited 2023 investigation by Verstka, president Vladimir Putin by May 2021 had already taken the decision to launch military action against Ukraine, in near-total secrecy and after consultations with his “personal banker”, Yuriy Kovalchuk.
An international crisis preluding Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which involved naval confrontations in the Sea of Azov and the mutual expelling of diplomats, had unfolded. NATO states, including Iceland, gradually awoke to the growing risk of war with Russia over Ukraine.
It would be amiss, however, to accuse Guðlaugur of political blindness or cynicism, especially in retrospect. In 2021, the spirit of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ — the near-mythologised alleged ability of Arctic states to cordon regional cooperation off conflicts in other parts of the world — was still alive and kicking. As in 2014, when the Arctic Council weathered the diplomatic fallout of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it was assumed that this crisis would also pass, without disrupting Arctic ‘business as usual’.
- Greenland and Denmark take over the Arctic Council chairmanship
But alas, the conflict did not pass. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Weeks later, the ‘Arctic Seven’ suspended all Arctic Council cooperation with Russia. Russia came close to quitting the organisation, deleted all mentions of it from its core Arctic strategy document, and suspended regular membership payments. Observers widely doubted whether the Arctic Council would survive the planned handover of the presidency from Russia to Norway.
In May 2023, at an austere online meeting marking the occasion of that handover, the ceremonial gavel did not feature. Much like the concept of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’ itself, its most representative token had vanished from the scene. Norway’s remarkable chairmanship from 2023 to 2025 effectively saved the Arctic Council from the brink of demise, partly through Oslo’s efforts to keep Russia just about involved enough in the Council’s remaining activities. But the underlying quagmire — the moral impossibility of collaborating with Russia in the Arctic while it wages a war of aggression elsewhere — was not resolved in the slightest. And when the Arctic Council reconvened for its 14th meeting, on 12 May, challenges to Arctic unity from without had aggravated even further.
While the Russia-Norway handover of 2023 had been complicated primarily by the war in Ukraine, the passing of the chairmanship from Norway to the Kingdom of Denmark in 2025 in addition stood under the sign of Donald Trump’s incessant threats to annex Greenland. The island, which is one of the Kingdom’s three composite countries, has since denounced the United States’ threats, as have Denmark and most of the European Arctic states. But Trump, characteristically, has not budged – and instead doubled down on insinuations that he might use military force to bring Greenland to heel. Meanwhile, the March 2025 election in Greenland reaffirmed the island’s desire to — even if with great prudence — eventually achieve territorial independence.
Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Tórshavn — the capital of the Faroe Islands, the realm’s third constituent country — thus faced a threefold challenge in crafting a unified approach to chairing the Arctic Council. First, they have to decide whether to continue Norway’s cautious reengagement with Russia. Oslo’s approach was never met with automatic approval in Denmark, which remains one of the EU’s staunchest hardliners on Russia and a firm supporter of Ukraine. Yet the Norwegian strategy may have resonated more intuitively with Greenland, where Arctic multilateralism is seen as a priority of primary importance. Second, both Denmark and Greenland strive to maintain good relations with the Arctic Council’s historically foundational power — the United States — while also pushing back against Washington’s challenges to their territorial sovereignty. Third, the very identity of the Kingdom of Denmark as an Arctic state is under renegotiation, as Greenland — the source of the realm’s Arctic status — moves gradually toward independent statehood.
In regards to the first two points, indications of future direction have remained elusive. The May meeting of the Arctic Council occurred behind closed doors, and while Russia participated, details on the Danish-Greenlandic position on future engagement have not been leaked. Arne O. Holm, editor-in-chief of the High North News, reported that the concluding statement prepared by Norway, which came in at twelve pages, had to be cut back by more than half — apparently under pressure from Moscow and Washington. And although officials in Copenhagen and Nuuk suggested that the U.S., Denmark and Greenland remained “aligned” on security issues and Arctic policy, Greenland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Motzfeldt, admitted that Trump’s continuing threats on Greenland would “maybe” complicate the Council’s political work.
The outcome of years-long negotiations between Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Tórshavn over the division of Arctic Council roles was, by contrast, more readily discernible. In an insightful commentary for the Arctic Institute, Marc Jacobsen and Svein Vigeland Rottem noted that Nuuk had successfully “[…] used the fact that Denmark’s status as an Arctic state depends on Greenland’s geographical location and membership of the realm to expand its foreign policy room for manoeuvre.”
As Denmark’s relationship with Greenland comes under strain from the assertive rhetoric of the new U.S. administration, Greenland has been able to gain internal leverage over Copenhagen. After initially insisting that key Arctic Council positions remain in the hands of Danish diplomats, Denmark ultimately conceded the post of Arctic Ambassador to Kenneth Høegh, a Greenlandic career diplomat. Høegh previously served as the head of Greenland’s representation office in Washington. He will maintain offices in both Nuuk and Copenhagen and will hold the prerogative of chairing Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) meetings. Gunvør Balle, from the Faroe Islands, has been appointed vice chair—likely a nod to the islands’ own assertion of a sub-Arctic identity, a claim that has reportedly drawn criticism from Greenland. The SAO representing the Danish realm as a whole will be Torsten Kjølby Nielsen, a Dane.
Most notably, however, the post of Arctic Council chairperson did not go to Denmark’s Foreign Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, but to his Greenlandic counterpart, Vivian Motzfeldt. A seasoned politician and high-level diplomat, Motzfeldt has played a central role in articulating Greenland’s evolving positions on independence and relations with the United States — frequently affirming that Greenlanders wish to be “neither Danes, nor Americans.” Her appointment underscores the extent to which Denmark now defers to Greenland’s growing diplomatic autonomy. It also serves as a subtle signal to Washington, particularly in the wake of Donald Trump’s overtures, that Greenland is capable of assuming state-like responsibilities on the international stage.
Although many disputes among the Danish realm’s constituent countries remain unresolved, the new division of labour among Greenland, Denmark, and the Faroe Islands within the Arctic Council highlights how external pressures on Arctic states can drive significant internal change — and even foster compromise. Unlike two years ago, when the Council’s ceremonial gavel remained symbolically buried beneath Tromsø’s frozen ground, it reappeared in photographs from this month’s handover ceremony. While not a sign of the return of ‘Arctic exceptionalism,’ the gavel’s reemergence may yet mark the beginning of a successful Danish-Greenlandic chairmanship — one in which internal diplomatic concessions might help inspire diplomatic achievements in relation to the outside world as well.
- The U.S. mulls spooks and special association agreements
Beyond the upbeat spectacle of the Arctic Council meeting, however, relations between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States have continued to spiral over the issue of Greenland. On May 6, the Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, issued a ‘collection emphasis message’ to intelligence agencies, directing them to “learn more about Greenland’s independence movement and attitudes on American resource extraction on the island.” Gabbard then — by lashing out at the paper in public — essentially confirmed the order’s existence.
Unsurprisingly, Danish officials reacted with fury. On May 8, the Danish government summoned the American ambassador to Copenhagen to express its displeasure over the reports. Denmark’s Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, told the Associated Press that “you cannot spy against an ally.” Lars Løkke Rasmussen told the New York Times that he would want to be “absolutely clear” that Denmark was upset, emphasising that efforts to “drive wedges into the unity of the kingdom” would not be tolerated by Copenhagen. Meanwhile, sources inside the American intelligence apparatus admitted to being befuddled by the order. The sources also admitted to their difficulties finding specialised staff, as intelligence operations of the kind ordered by Gabbard were “typically pointed toward perceived threats, not allied countries.”
The leak demonstrates just how seriously Trump’s staff are taking the president’s desire to ‘get’ Greenland. Behind the diplomatic stage — on which vice-president JD Vance has recently been allowed to strike a slightly more restrained tone on Greenland— U.S. authorities are preparing multiple scenario options to increase their country’s political control over the island. On May 9, Reuters reported that the U.S. planned to “propose to Greenland’s leaders that the island enter into a so-called Compact of Free Association, or COFA, with the United States.”
COFA agreements have been a tool of U.S. foreign policy since the 1980s. They were originally developed to replace the U.S.-U.N. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Upon gaining independence in the late 1970s, the former Trust territories of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands soon began to negotiate association agreements with Washington. Signed in the early 1980s, the COFA agreements oblige the U.S. to provide economic assistance and many essential services to associated states. In exchange, the U.S. military operates freely in their territories, trade with the U.S. is generally duty-free, and borders are open for labour migration in both directions. Citizens of COFA countries are also free to enlist in the U.S. military – in 2008, for instance, the Federated States of Micronesia had a higher per-capita enlistment rate than any of the U.S. states, and its citizens suffered more than five times the U.S. per-capita average of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.
U.S. support for the COFA agreements in the Pacific is generally bipartisan, in recognition of the strategic value of the Pacific island territories. The cost of COFA assistance to U.S. taxpayers is outweighed by the strategic benefits provided by the islands. Moreover, the agreements stop short of conferring any form of U.S. territorial status to signatories. Unlike the unincorporated U.S. territories — American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands — the COFA states retain independent statehood. Their status does therefore generally not trigger complex constitutional debates over political representation within the U.S. system — or the type of debates waged over the neo-colonialist nature of, say, the current situation of Puerto Rico.
From the point of view of America’s bureaucrats, offering a COFA agreement to Greenland might thus provide an elegant solution to the pressure exerted by president Trump. Should Greenland accept, the U.S. military could operate even more freely on the island. All remaining economic barriers to U.S. investments in Greenland’s much-coveted resource deposits would fall. Migration – always a hot button issue in Washington – would be negligible. And as Greenland would not have to become a part of the U.S.’ national territory, questions of political representation or the electoral impact of Greenland’s becoming a U.S. state could safely be sidelined.
On the other hand, the first COFA agreement concluded beyond the Pacific would break with historical precedent. It is also unclear whether it would actually satisfy the U.S. president: Trump’s desire for Greenland is likely driven by concerns of personal legacy as much as by strategic considerations. And most importantly, signing a COFA agreement would require that Greenland gain independence from Denmark first — a process that faces numerous roadblocks, and which has again been delayed by the outcome of Greenland’s national election in March.
Be that as it may, support for a merger between Greenland and the U.S. remains minuscule both on the island and among U.S. citizens. Recent polls have shown that an overwhelming majority of Greenlanders oppose becoming a part of the U.S.. Similar scepticism would likely also apply to the conclusion of a COFA agreement. And Trump’s plans are deeply unpopular among his compatriots as well — less than 20% of Americans think that an acquisition of Greenland by their country should be pursued, and only about 11% of U.S. voters would welcome an annexation of the island by force.
- What do the Russians actually think about the Arctic?
In a survey published in early April, Nail Farkhatdinov of the Russian NGO Arctida.io (click here for a recent interview by 66° North with Ilya Shumanov, Arctida’s co-founder) accomplished an increasingly rare feat: The provision of independent survey data from inside Russia, and on a politically sensitive topic to boot. For his survey, Nail cooperated with an independent Russian field research company. Together, they contacted 1,600 respondents inside Russia by phone. The resulting study is “[…] representative by gender, age, and federal districts across Russia, as well as by types of settlements based on population size.” In the aggregate, the survey data puts a finger on the pulse of Russian public opinion on Arctic issues. Intriguingly, it offers glimpses of Russia’s Arctic realities that are comparatively undiluted by regime propaganda. With Nail’s and Arctida’s permission, here is a link to the survey, as well as summary of its findings.
When asked about their views on military activities in the Russian Arctic, more than half of respondents (53%) said they supported the deployment of troops and military infrastructure in the region. However, since Nail’s last survey in December 2023, the share of Russians opposing the militarisation of the Arctic has grown by 4%, now reaching around 39% in total. Support for military expansion is particularly strong among older, wealthier Russian men, and weakest among young women. Meanwhile, 58% of respondents agreed that NATO’s presence in the Arctic is fuelling tensions with Russia, while 19% explicitly disagreed.
Support is also high for the view that the Arctic is Russia’s main resource treasure trove and that the country’s future growth will primarily stem from the exploitation of Arctic mineral resources. This belief is shared by 58% of respondents, especially those over the age of 60. Additionally, 68% support oil and mineral extraction in the Arctic, although opposition to these activities has increased by 4 percentage points.
In stark contrast to the Russian government’s environmental track record, a vast majority of Russians support efforts to reduce pollution in the Arctic. A full 86% strongly back such initiatives — an increase of 9 percentage points compared to the previous survey in December 2023. Concerns about global warming are also growing: 62% of respondents expressed worry about its effects on the Arctic, up 7 percentage points over the past two years.
Views on international cooperation in the Arctic remain divided. While 55% believe the region should be “a place for dialogue, stability, and constructive cooperation,” nearly one in five disagree. Support for developing cooperation with other countries in the Arctic has risen significantly — to 79%, up by 10 percentage points from 2023 — with especially high support among respondents under the age of 30. However, Russians are more divided than their government on who to cooperate with: 37% favour partnerships with friendly countries such as China, India, and other BRICS+ nations, while 31% prefer collaboration with other Arctic states like Norway or Canada. Russia’s Arctic partnership with China is supported by 63% of respondents, while 29% oppose it.
When it comes to who should decide the future of the Russian Arctic, public opinion is clear: 63% believe that indigenous peoples should determine the region’s fate, compared to just 18% who favour giving that role to security agencies and the military. Business interests are seen as least legitimate: only 12% of respondents believe commercial entities should have the greatest influence over Arctic policy.
Overall, the survey casts a revealing light on the gap between Russian public opinion and the Kremlin’s strategic direction for the Arctic. Many Russians are not fully convinced by official narratives portraying the Arctic as a military flashpoint. They are deeply concerned about environmental protection and support greater political representation for indigenous communities. While new Arctic partnerships with countries like China and India enjoy substantial support, Russians also still express hope for a return to cooperation with Western Arctic states. Finally, while expectations for economic development in the region remain high, the public prefers to see this growth balanced with environmental considerations.
This is a reproduction of an article that first appeared on 66° North. If you would like to read more posts by Lukas Wahden, you can sign up for his blog on Substack here.
Wahden is a PhD candidate at the Center for International Studies at Sciences Po Paris and an Associate Fellow with the Russia Program at George Washington University. His research focuses on the foreign policies of Russia and China, as well as the international politics of frontier regions — including the polar areas, deep sea and seabeds, and outer space.
