Japan’s enduring relationship with the Arctic: Student View
Japan’s interest and engagement in the Arctic region can be traced back to 1957, when Professor Ukichiro Nakaya of Hokkaido University took part in a U.S. research expedition to Greenland. Nakaya, who is credited with created the first artificial snow crystal two decades earlier, visited the country several more times before his death in 1962.
Fast forward to 1990, when Japan was admitted to the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) – despite the fact that it’s not from the region. The following year the country established a research station in the Norwegian settlement of Ny-Ålesund in 1991, under the auspices of the National Institute of Polar Research.
It wasn’t until 2013 that Japan was given permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, four years after it applied. During the 2015 Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, the country unveiled its official Arctic strategy in light of the rapidly shifting geopolitical, environmental, and economic landscape in the Indo-Pacific area. This year marks the 10th anniversary of that milestone.
Japan’s Arctic Strategy: Energy Diversification and Environmental Engagement
As the Arctic’s geopolitical and environmental significance has increased as a result of climate change, Japan has promoted sustainability initiatives in the Far North. The intensification of extreme weather events across middle and low-latitude regions has intensified its commitment to Arctic engagement
Japan’s Arctic Ambassador, Kazuko Shiraishi, delivered a speech in Moscow in 2016 in which he emphasized that Japan’s core interests in the Arctic include scientific research, utilization of the Northern Sea Route, and active participation in LNG projects (Yamal, Arctic LNG 2, Sakhalin, etc).
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011, Japan started reassessing its energy strategy and diversifying its energy resources. The Japanese economy is import-driven, with about 42% of its crude oil imports sourced from the Middle East. That has made Japan all too aware of the risks associated with an over-reliance on a geopolitically volatile region.
In response, the country has increasingly turned to alternative suppliers, with Australia, Qatar and Russia emerging as key partners in the post-2011 energy landscape. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia became essential to Japan’s energy diversification plan. The fact that that the country can import Russian LNG through the Northern Sea Route allows it to save both time and money.
Japan’s ongoing demand for Russian LNG benefits both countries: It bolsters Russia’s standing as a dependable energy provider and simultaneously increases Japan’s energy security. Despite China’s significant growth as an LNG importer, Russia is still looking for innovative ways to diversify its supply.
Japan’s position as a major LNG importer made it a significant stakeholder in the Russian Arctic. The region’s abundant reserves of crude oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals, and LNG have attracted substantial Japanese investment. Companies including Mitsui & Co. and the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corp. have made significant financial commitments to LNG projects located in the Yamal and Gydan Peninsulas.
Strategic Involvement in the Northern Sea Route
As a maritime nation, Japan has long shown a strategic interest in Arctic shipping routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route. This interest can be traced back to the 1990s, when the Nippon Foundation teamed up with the Ship and Ocean Foundation as well as Russian and Norwegian institutions to launch the International Northern Sea Route Program (INSROP).
INSROP was a six-year initiative between 1993 and 1999 to evaluate the viability of Arctic navigation. This program later evolved into the Japan Northern Sea Route Program (JANSROP, 2002–2005) and JANSROP II, specifically focusing on the Japanese shipping industry’s interests in the NSR.
The NSR provides the shortest maritime route between Asia and Europe via Russia’s Arctic coastline, approximately 3,900 nautical miles (7,223 km) shorter than the conventional southern route. With a reduced distance, voyage time is also significantly shortened. For example, cargo shipped through the Suez Canal may require up to 35 days, compared to about 20 days via the NSR.
The NSR is also considered safer and more stable than traditional routes such as the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal, which are frequently threatened by piracy. Nonetheless, its advantages are tempered by high transit fees imposed by Russia and regulatory constraints, such as requiring foreign vessels to notify Russian authorities three months in advance.
The NSR is very important for Asia-Pacific countries because they use it to import LNG from Russia. Current trends suggest that the route may increasingly be limited to energy transpor—particularly oil and gas—rather than general cargo shipping.
Japan received its first LNG shipment via the Arctic in 2012 from Norway’s Snohvit LNG project in Hammerfest. Because of its proximity to the Bering Strait, Hokkaido in Japan is ideally situated to function as a hub for Arctic marine trade.
Energy as the Core of Japan–Russia Relations
Energy constitutes a significant chunk of Japan–Russia bilateral relations, with almost 70% of Japan’s total imports from Russia comprising energy resources, according to data from the International Trade Centre (ITC). The anticipated growth of LNG production in the Arctic region—to an estimated 91 million tons by 2035—is a key factor behind the rising number of LNG shipments via the NSR.
The hydrocarbon trade has historically formed a core pillar of Japan–Russia economic cooperation. During the first meeting of the Japan-Soviet Economic Cooperation Committee in March 1966, emphasis was placed on constructing a pipeline with Japanese financial aid from the oil fields of Western Siberia to the Pacific Ocean.
The successsful completion of the Arctic LNG 2 project is critical to Russia’s overall objective of growing its Arctic resource base. By 2025, the Kremlin aimed to boost LNG production from 12.86 million tonnes per year (mtpa) in 2018 to 73 mtpa. Arctic LNG 2, located onshore on the Gydan Peninsula, comprises three LNG trains with 6.6 and 19.8 mtpa design capacities. Meanwhile, Japan confined itself to financial support and the construction of a modular plant as a part of its commitment to Yamal LNG.
Arctic LNG 2 represents a lucrative opportunity for Japan because it provides access to the Asian market and enables the country to diversify its LNG import sources, thereby enhancing energy security. However, after peaking in 2014, Japan’s domestic demand for natural gas has steadily decreased, mainly due to the slow reactivation of nuclear reactors that shut down after the 2011 Fukushima accident.
As a counter response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan implemented stringent measures akin to those adopted by other nations, including revoking Russia’s most-favoured-nation trade status and freezing Russian central bank assets equivalent to approximately 10% of Russia’s energy reserves. Nonetheless, due to its significant dependence on Russian energy, Japan maintained its participation in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in Russia’s Far East, where Mitsui & Company and Mitsubishi Corp. hold a combined stake of 22.5%.
Tokyo’s short- and medium-term energy outlook deteriorated further following President Putin’s June decree, which compelled Japan to renegotiate its involvement in the Sakhalin-2 project—at the urging of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, Mitsui & Co. and Mitsubishi were able to retain their stakes under terms offered by the new Russian operator. This development has placed energy security at the forefront of Kishida’s economic security strategy. Consequently, Kishida has advocated for the reactivation of Japan’s idled nuclear reactors and the advancement of next-generation nuclear technology.
In 2021 Japan imported 74 million tonnes of LNG from Russia, while only 10 of its 36 operational nuclear reactors were active. Each reactor restart is estimated to replace approximately 1 million tonnes of LNG—a resource that Kishida has excluded from additional sanctions on Russia.
Strategic Imperatives in Response to Sino–Russian Arctic Integration
Russia and China’s deepening cooperation in the Arctic—particularly along the Northern Sea Route—has created a very alarming situation for Indo-Pacific countries (paricularly Japan). As part of the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia and China announced the “New Silk Road” in 2017 to develop the NSR as a critical maritime corridor.
In 2024, Rosatom of Russia and China’s Hainan Yangpu New Shipping Co. formalized a contract to build ice-class cargo vessels and operate year-round NSR services. Western sanctions imposed on Russia allowed China to enhance its dominance in the NSR.
China has since invested heavily in NSR logistics, including icebreakers, Arctic ports (such as Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, and Tiksi), and rail infrastructure. Concurrent coast guard, naval, and bomber patrols in the Arctic and North Pacific reflect a concerted military dimension.
Potential dual-use applications are of particular concern to Japan. Russia worries that China’s Arctic research facilities and icebreakers could enable PLAN submarines and enhance strategic operations in polar regions. Coordinated air and naval patrols in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea are also seen as provocative.
Tokyo consequently views Sino-Russian Arctic collaboration as progressing toward a militarily-oriented, strategically integrated NSR. The convergence of intelligence-sharing, expanded military activities, and dual-use infrastructure is viewed as a direct threat to Japan’s security environment, especially in its northern territories. In response, Japan must strategically navigate this evolving Arctic landscape.
Conclusion
Energy diversification, climate change, and maritime security have all influenced Japan’s Arctic participation, which has grown from early research trips in the 1950s to a complete policy. Its reliance on the Northern Sea Route, investments in LNG projects, and ongoing collaboration with Russia highlight its opportunities and weaknesses.
Japan must strike a compromise between its geopolitical imperatives and its economic security demands due to the significant strategic challenge posed by Sino-Russian integration in the Arctic.
As the Arctic becomes a new frontier of global power competition, Japan must carefully steer its course in the High North to safeguard its energy security and national interests
Medha Bhardwaj is a Ph.D. student at Jawaharlal Nehru University researching Geopolitical Competition in the Arctic. She was awarded the HPAIR Fellowship, Alexander Gorchakov Fund Fellowship, PORA Fellowship, and invited as India’s representative at international forums in Moscow, Yakutsk, and Khanty-Mansiysk.
