In and out of love: Arctic politics in October
This is a reproduction of an article that first appeared on 66° North. If you would like to read more posts by Lukas Wahden, you can sign up for his blog on Substack here.
Trump disenchants Russia, China makes Arctic shipping history, Brussels and Moscow want to update Arctic policies
Capriciousness is the mark of a bad friend, and an even worse enemy. Russian elites learned this lesson at the end of October, as they found themselves at the receiving end of a sudden policy reversal by U.S. president Donald Trump — one of the kind that has kept their counterparts in Europe on pins and needles for the better part of a year.
On 22 October, the U.S. Treasury placed sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, Russia’s two biggest oil companies. The new measures aim to compel Putin to budge on his maximalist conditions for a ceasefire in Ukraine, and were announced only a day after Trump had angrily shelved plans for a meeting with the Russian president in Hungary. While the Kremlin was quick to proclaim its “immunity” to U.S. sanctions, independent experts highlighted that they would likely make a significant dent in Russia’s oil exports to India, as well as the success of overseas ventures by Lukoil and Rosneft. Whether their deterrent effect endures — and also extends to China, Russia’s other major oil client — will depend on whether Washington also opts to impose and enforce secondary sanctions on banks and other intermediaries handling payments.
In any case, Trump’s announcement has put a halt to a six-month period of quasi-détente in U.S.-Russia relations. Both Moscow and Washington had hoped to entice the other side to make concessions over Ukraine by temporarily dispensing with sticks, and offering essentially identical carrots: A range of deals on joint fossil fuel extraction, especially in the Arctic. Symbolically, those discussions had culminated in a visit by Putin to Alaska on 15 August, which failed to produce meaningful results. But Trump’s decision to sanction Rosneft and Lukoil, in spite of the associated risks to global oil markets, likely marks a realisation on the part of the U.S. president, which will probably also soon take hold in Moscow: that while Trump and Putin have overlapping views on the desirability of Arctic fossil fuel extraction, this overlap is in itself insufficient to compensate for remaining disagreements between the two countries on the war in Ukraine and the future of the European security order.
1. Moscow reckons with Trump’s oil sanctions
During the summer and early autumn, Russia’s government officials engaged in near-endless chatter about a possible resumption of cooperation with the U.S. in the Arctic. In late August, for instance, president Putin proposed “cooperation with American partners” on Alaskan energy projects during a meeting with employees of Russia’s nuclear sector. On the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, called the development of mineral resources by Russia and the U.S. in the Arctic “one of the most promising areas of cooperation [on the bilateral agenda].” Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, excitedly mused about the possibility of building a tunnel under the Bering strait, and confidently announced a window of opportunity for U.S.-China-Russia joint ventures in Russian Arctic hydrocarbon projects.
The Russian press was similarly awash with rumours: Allegedly, according to Reuters, the White House had mulled using Russian icebreakers in Alaska ahead of Trump’s summit with Putin. Russia’s state news agency, TASS, in September relegated the war in Ukraine to a “secondary issue in the larger picture of how to improve relations between Russia and the United States,” which could supposedly be achieved through cooperation in “space and the Arctic.” Aleksey Fadeev of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic University told the same outlet that the U.S. could consider co-financing the Northern Sea Route (NSR). And Alexander Vorotnikov, an associate professor at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, even proposed “[the joint] creation and development of data management centres for the development of artificial intelligence, including in the Arctic.”
The Russian rumour mill quietly shut down in late October, as commentators came to realise that their country would perhaps not, in fact, be able to have its cake and eat it. Russia craves an end to the Western efforts to isolate it internationally, a lifting of sanctions, as well as its recognition as a “great power” and equal partner by the U.S., especially in Europe and the Arctic. But the country’s elites will need to live with the fact that they likely cannot achieve these goals without also making painful concessions on Ukraine, in spite of Trump’s sympathies for Russia’s official worldview. But beyond all the talk, in what ways might the new U.S. measures, as well as the EU’s 19th sanctions package, actually impact Russia’s development plans for the Arctic?
For one thing, the American oil sanctions are not entirely unprecedented. Trump has not, so far, been willing to rescind a last-minute sanctions package levelled against Russia’s Arctic oil operations by the Biden administration in mid-January, which targeted Gazpromneft’s “Prirazlomnoye” field near the Yamal peninsula, as well as Rosneft subsidiaries involved in the development of the Vankor cluster in Krasnoyarsk Krai. As summarised by Atle Staalesen in the Barents Observer, the new sanctions package in addition now means that all planned Russian hydrocarbon projects along the country’s Arctic coastline are under some form of international sanctions.
Lukoil, for example, will see increased scrutiny by international clients on its oil products from the Timan-Pechora area of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, where local production is handled for shipping at the large Varandey terminal on the coast of the Pechora Sea. U.S. measures will also throw doubt on Rosneft’s ability to complete works on the Vostok-Oil project, and connect several new oil fields on the Taymyr peninsula to a planned new oil terminal on the coast of the Yenisey bay by pipeline. The crisis surrounding Gazpromneft’s plans for further Arctic offshore fields, including in the Gulf of Ob, is likely to deepen. Key Russian upstream projects will likely not receive high levels of international investment. And Novatek will have to rely even further on Chinese goodwill for the continued operation of Arctic LNG 2 on the Gydan peninsula, as the EU now officially aims for a complete cessation of Russian LNG purchases by 2027.
Various loopholes do, however, remain. Their persistence highlights just how difficult it has been for Western states to deny Russia the revenue streams it needs for its war, while also following their own energy security imperatives. Novatek, for instance, has continuously been able to escape broad sanctions from the EU and U.S., thanks in part to the involvement of French energy company Total Energies in the Arctic LNG 2 project. But the paradoxical usefulness of Russian LNG in cushioning the economic blow of Europe’s post-2022 turn away from Russian pipeline gas clearly also played a role. In 2025, the EU once again imported record-breaking amounts of Russian LNG, due mostly to purchases by France, Belgium and Spain. And Rosneft, which retains links to some of its former subsidiaries in Germany, as well as Lukoil, a major supplier of oil to Hungary and Slovakia, have so far escaped blanket sanctions from the EU.
2. Russia to overhaul Arctic strategy documents
Beyond the oil sanctions, the Russian media also debated a wide range of other Arctic problems. Most notably, Alexey Chekunkov, the head of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, announced in September that president Putin would soon sign off on a major overhaul of Russia’s economic development strategy for its Arctic regions. In early October, Nikolay Patrushev, presidential aide and head of Russia’s Maritime Collegium, confirmed Chekunkov’s statement, and also announced that a new version of the more security-oriented “Fundamentals of Russian State Policy in the Arctic up to 2035” would be prepared by the government. The last iteration of the “Fundamentals” was put together in 2020, and substantially revised in 2023. The new version will likely cover the period up to 2050.
Both of the new Russian strategy documents can be expected to reflect the country’s increasingly hawkish reading of the geopolitical environment of the Arctic, as well as its rapidly evolving domestic priorities. Recent soundbites by Russian authorities foreshadow the probable tone of the updates: In September, Vladislav Maslennikov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of European Affairs, complained to RIA Novosti that the other Arctic Council members were “sitting around, waiting for the weather to change”, adding that Russia was growing impatient to advance “Arctic cooperation with interested non-regional states.” In October, Maslennikov doubled down, telling a conference audience that “the political climate in the Arctic [was] changing for the worse.” In July, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev had already proclaimed that Russia was headed for a “serious struggle between countries for Arctic territories.” And at a meeting of Russia’s Council for Strategic Development of the Navy in August, Nikolay Patrushev declared that the “West has long been implementing political, legal, military, and economic measures aimed at thwarting Russia’s plans in the Arctic, including challenging Russian sovereignty over the NSR.”
In late October, Murmansk governor Andrey Chibis posted on Telegram to share “Arctic in Numbers 2025”, a research report by the State Council of the Russian Federation Commission on the NSR and the Arctic, the body tasked with drafting Russia’s Arctic development strategy. The report contains details on Russia’s planned investments into sixteen “node settlements” across its Arctic regions, which the government plans to link up with NSR infrastructure and new resource production sites. The report also features an interview with Vladimir Panov, Rosatom’s special representative on questions of Arctic development, which highlights plans to develop “independent national” solutions for the satellite monitoring of Arctic waters, where the country currently depends “too heavily” on “foreign partners” (read: China).
In summary, the upcoming revamp of Russia’s Arctic strategy documents can be expected to follow several guiding themes. Politically, the documents will articulate an explicitly antagonistic stance toward the West and place an even greater emphasis on military metrics. They can also be expected to signal either the abandonment — or further downgrading — of Russia’s engagement with the Arctic Council, while formalising intentions to develop alternative cooperation mechanisms with BRICS+ partners. At the same time, the strategies will probably also highlight Russia’s goal of achieving “technological sovereignty”, that is, replacing critical foreign technologies, such as weather satellites and offshore extraction systems with domestically produced alternatives. In developmental terms, the new documents will likely seek to better integrate demographic and investment policies with infrastructure projects along the NSR.
But as is usually the case with Russian policy documents, a reminder is due of how they have consistently overstated the country’s capacity to meet self-imposed targets. While Russia’s aspiration to achieve “technological sovereignty” is well-known, its scientific and industrial base continues to lag far behind those of China and the West, hampering the development of state-of-the-art technologies (for instance, in the offshore energy sector). Similarly, although Moscow would indeed prefer to move beyond the paralysis of the Arctic Council, the BRICS+ states — and China in particular — have shown little enthusiasm for supporting Russian initiatives that could undermine the circumpolar governance framework and jeopardise their observer status within the organisation.
3. China makes Arctic shipping history, India fears being frozen out
On October 15, the Chinese-owned container ship Istanbul Bridge made Arctic shipping history by completing the first commercial container journey by a regular vessel from China (Ningbo-Zhoushan) to Europe (Felixtowe) via the Russian-controlled NSR. The journey took twenty days, around half of the transit time commonly accumulated on more southerly routes, and thus fulfilled long-standing predictions of commercial shipping becoming possible as a result of retreating Arctic sea ice.
While container voyages between Russian and Chinese ports along parts of the NSR have become more common in recent years, with twenty planned for the 2025 summer season alone, the first complete Arctic journey from China to a major European port marks a milestone in Sino-Russian efforts to turn the NSR into a commercial shipping artery of global standing. The journey also served as a pilot for plans by the ship’s Hong Kong-based operator to establish a regular “China-Europe Arctic Express Service” of container ships during the Arctic summer season.
The trip to the U.K. of the Istanbul Bridge sparked a buzz of global media attention, which was not always able to accurately capture the longue durée of Sino-Russian cooperation on Arctic logistics. More critical voices pointed to the ship’s lack of ice navigation reinforcements, and the likely violations of the legally binding Polar Code it occurred on the NSR.
Both Russian and Chinese state media tried to downplay the importance of the event, attempting to reassure international audiences that China would “not seek to dominate international shipping routes.” But the underlying tone of triumphalism was hard to conceal: In late October, China and Russia convened their annual joint committee on cooperation on the Northern Sea Route to announce the signing of a new deal to “jointly develop and commercialise shipping along the Northern Sea Route in the Russian Arctic.”
Meanwhile, India, which has itself jockeyed to become Russia’s partner of preference in NSR shipping, accelerated its efforts to buy in on the development of the route. In September, Rosatom’s Vladimir Panov gave an interview to India’s NDTV channel, in which he underlined that New Delhi could “become an important factor in the NSR’s future development.” In late August, India and Russia had convened the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation, an annual forum which in recent years has turned increasingly towards maritime cooperation along the NSR and the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor, and which concluded with a joint pledge to cooperate on the NSR despite sanctions, and for India to construct more ice-going vessels for Russia.
The Economic Times, one of India’s biggest newspapers, reported that Vladimir Putin’s planned state visit to India in December will focus on Arctic cooperation, hinting at some form of Indo-Russian Arctic pact and quoting unnamed government sources that Russia would want for India to “play a more significant role at the Arctic Council”.
4. Will the EU come up with a new Arctic policy?
On 28 October, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen held an Arctic-themed speech at the 77th session of the Nordic Council in Stockholm. According to a review by Malte Humpert, the speech drew “connections between the impact of climate change in the Arctic and the changing geopolitics in the region”, mentioned the Arctic twelve times and announced that the EU “was in the process of reviewing its Arctic policy to make it fit for our time.”
The European Union last released an official Arctic policy document in 2021, but that document predates Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and has been criticised for being out of step with the denigrating geopolitical environment of the region. The EU has traditionally been hesitant to involve itself in Arctic security discussions, partly due to opposition by non-member Norway. But the EU has also increasingly found itself obliged to formulate shared opinions on issues including Russia’s Arctic military modernisation, China’s regional assertiveness, or the U.S.’ threats to Greenland.
Experts consulted by 66° North were unsure what, exactly, would become of von der Leyen’s initiative once it made its way through the EU’s Babylonian bureaucracy. As was pointed out by Arthur Amelot, a former External Expert at the EU Commission, conflicts of interest between EU agencies over priorities to be set a new Arctic policy are likely to persist. Andreas Raspotnik, director of the High North Center for Business and Governance at Nord University, similarly had more questions than answers about the matter. Raspotnik pointed to the EU Commission’s 2026 Working Plan, a bureaucratic master key of sorts for the upcoming year, in which no review, update or consultations on Arctic policy are currently foreseen. He also wondered why no official conclusion on Arctic issues had yet been taken on the all-important level of the Council of the European Union, and whether intra-bureaucratic coordination would currently even be possible given under-staffing in the relevant EU agencies.
Whether von der Leyen’s address will be followed up by concrete action will thus remain to be seen, but the Stockholm speech clearly signals a growing awareness on the EU’s leadership level of the importance of the Arctic for the continent’s wider security.
5. Arctic islands back in the focus of Russia and the U.S.
The international status of various Arctic and sub-Arctic islands continued to fuel the geopolitical imagination of pundits and politicians in the United States and Russia alike. In the late summer, the Russian newspaper Kommersant’ picked up on an article by active-duty US Army Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Fritz in Breaking Defence. In his essay, Fritz proposed for Washington to “purchase” the Komandorski Islands from Russia for “$15 billion”. The Komandorski Islands, or Commander Islands in U.S. diction, is a series of islands off Russia’s Kamchatka peninsula that forms the westernmost end of the Aleutian Island chain in the northern Pacific. Such an offer could be justified, according to Fritz, by the strategic advantage the Aleutians would afford in monitoring Chinese nuclear attack submarine traffic through the Bering strait and into the Arctic Ocean. During a press conference, RIA Novosti confronted Russia’s MFA spokeswoman Maria Zakharova with the article. Zakharova denied the possibility of such a purchase, and suggested that “instead of purchasing Arctic islands, the American lieutenant colonel use the money to pay off the U.S. national debt.”
The Russian media also discussed a recent National Interest article, in which Brandon Weichert had suggested that the U.S. government should “reassert” a historical claim to Wrangel Island off Russia’s Chukotka region. 66° North published a detailed critique of the piece in September, warning that such claims could undermine the fragile sovereignty consensus of the Arctic.
Throughout the late summer, Russia also gradually abandoned its stance of neutral disinterest on U.S.-Denmark squabbles over the future of Greenland. In a series of Russian-language interviews, Russia’s ambassador to Copenhagen, Vladimir Barbin, complained about Denmark’s alleged “militarisation of the island of Bornholm [in the Baltic]”, but also weighed in on debates over Greenland. In September, Barbin criticised the Arctic Light 2025 exercise on the island, which had assembled forces from France, Sweden, Germany, Norway and Denmark in an attempted show of European support for Nuuk against threats from Washington. Barbin stated that the exercises may have been addressed at the U.S., but that Denmark was unable to make this fact explicit, instead “preferring to discuss the need to contain Russia in the Arctic”, a decision which would require “appropriate military-technical responses” from Moscow. Danish officials, perhaps rather wisely, abstained from responding.
PhD candidate in International Relations at SciencesPo Paris and Associate Fellow with the Russia Program at George Washington University. He most writes about Russia, the poles, oceans and space.
