Can the Arctic Council overcome a ‘governance vacuum’ on its own?

Lloyd Axworthy was Canada’s Foreign Minister when the Arctic Council was created in 1996, and he still takes an interest in the organization’s activities.

In an article for Policy Magazine last month, Axworthy wrote that there is a “governance vacuum” in the Arctic. He attributed it mainly to recent U.S. policies that undercut multilateral institutions and seek control of Greenland – policies that tend to undermine the effectiveness of the region’s main diplomatic forum, the Arctic Council. He called for the establishment of a parallel platform among Canada and Nordic countries of states “committed to a liberal international order.”

Axworthy may be right when he suggests that Canada and the Nordic region would benefit from having the ability to consult among themselves outside the Arctic Council about at least some Arctic issues. Whether another forum is needed – such as one focused on security – is far from clear though.

The former minister’s proposal is significant because during his tenure, Canada proposed the establishment of the Council and convinced the U.S. and others to join the effort. He is correct when he says that the U.S. wasn’t willing for the Council to have a mandate covering military security issues. Instead, the Council was designated as a forum for discussing matters related to the environment and sustainable development.

At the time, Canadian advanced an agenda – through the efforts of Indigenous leader (and now Canada’s Governor General) Mary Simon – of promoting domestic political interests of the Canadian Native communities seeking economic development and recognition. This was particularly true of Inuit communities.

The establishment of the Arctic Council was a groundbreaking step toward the inclusion of Indigenous representatives in Arctic regional governance by creating a body in which Indigenous Groups sat at the table with the eight Arctic States. That aspect of the Council has not (so far) been undermined by the United States turning away from multilateral cooperation.

Instead, what has most undermined the Council is Russia’s devastating war against Ukraine, which has made joint efforts among Arctic nations extremely difficult. Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in 2022 at first caused a full pause in the work of the Council, and despite a partial resumption of activities, the organization has still not been able to regain its effectiveness.

Russia’s actions resulted in Finland and Sweden seeking membership in NATO, and now seven of the eight Council Member States are NATO members. The ability for these states to find common cause on undertakings related to  environment and development is for the time being significantly reduced.

This is not solely due to the Ukraine conflict. There are also concerns that Russia may have longer term military designs against NATO members, not to mention that it is suspected of undertaking attacks on Western allies’ infrastructure, as well as engaging in political interference.

Russia makes up half the Arctic, and a key rationale for the Council has been that it provided a crossroads where communication with that country in relatively collegial, and productive circumstances could take place. This was a key reason for U.S. interest in the Council – the ability to find a place open to channels of communication with Russia. The Council could then pursue multilateral solutions to problems (such as in the field of environmental cooperation) where multilateral solutions might be easier than the U.S. and Russia trying to tackle them bilaterally.

Forum for discussion

Axworthy should understand that the main value of the Council is not in its acting as a forum for political discussion among leaders (who in any event meet under the Council’s auspices only once every two years at ministerial meetings). Rather it is because it can initiate and implement projects within its working groups.

In those working groups, technical experts have been able to advance cooperation on protection of the Arctic marine environment, study polar shipping, promote science, protect flora and fauna, advance search and rescue practices, and much more. The Council has also given rise to new treaties among the Arctic states on a variety of issues.

Thus, if there were a parallel structure for Arctic cooperation among Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, what would it work on? It likely wouldn’t add much if it covered the same technical topics as the Arctic Council’s working groups, with the same Canadian and Nordic experts attending both. Is a parallel organization needed if the object is political-level discussions rather than focused, technical cooperation?

The Arctic Council still has value even at reduced capacity, and Axworthy is suggesting it should be supplemented rather than replaced. That’s good because three decades of work has gone into developing the Council as an institution. Once the Ukraine conflict subsides (which it must at some point), the Council may rebound to provide value for not only the Arctic states, but Arctic Indigenous groups, as well as non-Arctic countries that are active in the region.

If Canada and the Nordic countries find common cause in a new forum, they should seek out topics where they can work together productively – not necessarily in opposition to the U.S., but where they can advance their mutual interests.

One area might be in relation to ocean-related cooperation and conservation, focusing on their maritime interests and the Central Arctic Ocean – for example, ice navigation, marine plastic pollution, coastal management, and ocean acidification. These countries have large maritime exclusive economic zones where collaboration could be strengthened.

With the U.S. and Russia lacking the will to collaborate on international efforts to study and address climate change, Canada and the Nordic countriess may find it useful to cooperate on that subject as well. And whether it is within the context of the Arctic Council or another forum, as Axworthy suggests, the Indigenous communities should be full partners.

It will be interesting to see if the current Canadian government endorses Minister Axworthy’s proposal that it convene a new parallel organization.

Evan T. Bloom is a former career diplomat and Director of the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. As a State Department lawyer, he assisted in the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996. He currently advises a number of organizations on polar issues.