“Apparently, God himself commanded the Russian Orthodox bishop to build a chapel right under NATO radars”

Russian security forces are strengthening their influence in northern Norway — and sowing division within the country.

Vardø is an island in northern Norway located on the coast of the Barents Sea. It is home to a picturesque fishing town where about two thousand people live (including around 40 Russians). The first thing you see when approaching the island are huge white cupolas. These are NATO radars. They stand on a hill like giant mushrooms.

The Norwegian Intelligence Service uses them for space monitoring and observing the airspace of the Russian Arctic. Russia is Vardø’s closest neighbour. On a clear day, if you go down to the shore, you can see the Kola Peninsula, separated from Norway by the Varanger Fjord. 150 kilometres east of Vardø is Gadzhiyevo, where the Russian fleet of nuclear submarines is based. These neighbours, Russia and Norway, have a rich shared history.

It holds memories of how in the 18th century Russian Pomors sailed to Vardø to trade flour and birch tar for fish and salt, how both countries fought in World War II, how they later went through the Cold War, and how they then tried to restore relations. Certain moments of this history (often distorted) are now actively used by the Kremlin to gain the trust and support of the residents of northern Norway. Moreover, by manipulating the real discontent of northerners with Oslo’s policies, they instilled the idea that it is Russia that cares for, understands, and protects their interests better than their own government, leading to the conclusion that Russia is a much closer ally for Norwegian northerners than the central part of their own country. Chapter one, in which’god himself’ commands the Russian bishop to build an Orthodox chapel — right under Nato’s radars in a neighbouring country Starting in 2017, during the tenure of the previous mayor of Vardø, Robert Jensen, the rector of the St. Onezhsky Cathedral, Archpriest Alexander Koptev, and Bishop of Plesetsk and Kargopol, Alexander Zaitsev, began negotiations regarding the construction of an Orthodox chapel on the Norwegian island — as part of ‘establishing ties with Vardø’, which they pursued by regularly visiting there.

Archpriest Koptev is a former military man. The diocese’s website states that in the early 1980s, he served two years of mandatory military service, followed by another six years in the Russian armed forces in the settlement of Katunino, Arkhangelsk region, where a Northern Fleet airfield was located at the time. Among other things, several types of military aircraft used for maritime reconnaissance and electronic warfare were based in Katunino. In 1997, Koptev was ordained as a priest. The bishop of Kargopol and Plesetsk, Alexander Zaitsev, supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine: in the winter of 2023, he visited wounded soldiers in a hospital, and in the summer, he participated in a charity concert ‘to help the fighters of the special military operation’ (it took place in Plesetsk).

For ‘propaganda of aggressive war against Ukraine and interference in the internal church affairs of Ukraine’, Zaitsev even ended up on the list of the Ukrainian government-associated project ‘War and Sanctions’. This project operates with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption. Anyone can send data on Russian figures who supported the war in Ukraine and demand their inclusion in the sanctions lists. At home, in the satellite town of Plesetsk, Mirny, the bishop has his own cathedral. You can only enter Mirny with a pass — it is a closed city under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence.

Until the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Koptev and Zaitsev regularly visited Vardø for the unveiling of monuments to Norwegian partisans and consecrated Orthodox crosses, which were actively installed there at the initiative of Russian officials and security forces. The initiative to build an Orthodox chapel in Vardø was initially supported by both officials and local residents of Vardø. “Patriarch Kirill blessed the idea of construction, and Bishop Zaitsev even indicated exactly where it should be built — in close proximity to the radar station. To the Norwegian officials who participated in these negotiations, the Russian clergyman explained that the choice of location was supposedly ‘dictated to him by God himself,’ — the current mayor of Vardø, Tor-Erik Labahå, tells me. He took office in 2023.

The pandemic slowed down the implementation of the project, but did not affect the plans themselves. The Russian Orthodox Church continued to develop the project on paper. At the very beginning, recalls Mayor Labahå, the project was declared as just a small chapel — “something very modest that could be useful for Orthodox sailors visiting Vardø and remind of the cultural ties between Russia and Norway.” But at the final stage of planning, it became clear that the Russian priests had changed their minds about being modest. When they presented the finished blueprint to the Norwegian officials, a discussion began in the Vardø municipality. After consulting, the Norwegians refused to build the chapel.

“Primarily because the Russian pressure [on officials from Vardø] continued to intensify. Their plans grew into the construction of a church as high as 17 metres. What initially seemed like a small cultural initiative quickly turned into something much more ambitious. At the same time, Russia did not even properly consult with the Norwegian side,” says Tor-Erik Labahå. “After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all these actions of the Russian clergy in Vardø no longer seem like a harmless sincere impulse,” continues the mayor.

And, of course, to create a flow of Russian clergy and delegations into a sensitive area, ensuring their influence and presence there, and possibly — gathering intelligence. Chapter two, in whichthe king apologises ‘too late’ Professor and head of the Barents region department at UiT the Arctic University of Norway, Kari Aga Myklebost, has been researching relations between Russia and Norway’s northern territories for many years. In the early 1990s, Myklebost studied at the history faculty of Saint Petersburg State University, and later in Moscow and Vladivostok. “In the 2000s, when I was already working at the university in Tromsø, we often collaborated with Russian historians,” she says. “Since 2014, the Kremlin’s and Russian colleagues’ view of the Great Patriotic War has become more politicised.

They increasingly used that war to legitimise Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, claiming that Russia is fighting ‘neo-Nazism’ there and that it is a heroic continuation of the feats of the Soviet Red Army.” Furthermore, Myklebost began to notice that after the annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin started actively interfering with propaganda and ‘distorted historical narratives’ in the minds of Norwegians — predominantly residents of the northern part of the country. In order to gain the opportunity to carry out this activity, Russian security forces used a ‘vulnerable moment’ in Norway’s post-war history. In 1940, during the German occupation, 45 residents of Vardø and nearby towns in northern Norway fled across the Soviet border to the Kola Peninsula. They joined the Red Army, trained as intelligence officers near Murmansk, and then returned to German-occupied northern Norway to spy on the enemy. Later, during the Cold War, when hostility towards the Soviet Union was growing in Norway, the story of the Norwegian partisans’ exploits ‘due to their sympathy for the communists’ began to be hushed up at the state level.

They were considered Soviet spies, monitored, and regarded with suspicion by society. Norwegian authorities assumed that the partisans maintained contacts with their former Soviet handlers. “Marginalisation and suspicion towards the partisans remain a painful memory in some municipalities in the north [of Norway],” says Professor Myklebost. “Some there even believe that justice for the Norwegian partisans has not yet fully prevailed, as their feat has not been properly appreciated.” The head of the department at the Vardø historical museum, Inger Lene Nyttingnes, acknowledges: “The activities of the Russian security forces in restoring ‘historical memory’ have elicited a strong response in the local community. And although now no one in Norway has any doubts that our partisans should be respected and honoured, the fact remains: the Norwegian authorities honoured them too late,” says Nyttingnes.

“[Norwegian] King Harald V only in 1992 expressed support and apologies to the partisans and their families for the contempt from the state and society they had to endure after the end of World War II. It was this vulnerable moment in the relations between the residents of northern Norwegian towns and the government that Russia took advantage of.” Chapter three, in which Russian FSB veterans restore ‘historical justice’ in Norway Since 2011, Russian FSB veterans and officials have conducted twice-yearly memory tours by bus from Russia to Norway: in May, in honour of Victory Day, and in October, in honour of the liberation of the eastern part of Finnmark by the Red Army in the autumn of 1944. Regularly visiting Finnmark, Murmansk security officials and politicians imposed on local residents the idea that the Oslo authorities were downplaying the history of Norwegian partisans and did not understand the harsh realities that occurred during the Second World War in northern Norway, while the Russian side, on the contrary, recognises and honours their memory. “After the annexation of Crimea, during their ‘memory tours’, Russian figures also criticised Oslo’s sanctions policy towards Russia and the support that Norway provides to Ukraine,” says Myklebost. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the professor studied documents related to these trips of Russian figures to Finnmark, as well as how information about these ‘memory tours’ was presented in Russian state media.

In addition to the head of the FSB Veterans Association in Murmansk, Gennady Gurylyov, these ‘memory tours’ were attended by the deputy chairman of the Murmansk Regional Duma, Igor Chernyshenko (since 2013 — a member of the Russian Federation Council), priests of the Russian Orthodox Church, representatives of the Pechenga municipal district (Murmansk region), and journalists from the Russian TV company TV21. According to the official version, this tour was organised to honour the memory of Soviet soldiers and Norwegian partisans who fought against Nazi Germany. After the wreath-laying ceremony, speeches, and prayers on the Russian side of the border, the memory tour continued in Norwegian Kirkenes. There, the group was welcomed by the Russian Consul General and Russians living in Eastern Finnmark. Then the tour continued in the towns of Vardø and Kiberg, where the group was met by Russians, as well as invited Norwegian local historians and cultural figures involved in the history of partisans and historical ties between Norway and Russia.

During their subsequent visits to northern Norway, Russian representatives erected monuments there in honour of Soviet and Norwegian partisans. “The organisation ‘Shield’ later reported on its website that elderly Norwegian residents attended the opening ceremony and expressed deep gratitude to Russia for the liberation in 1944,” says Myklebost. In 2013, the Consul General of Norway in Murmansk received a letter from the head of ‘Shield’, Gennady Gurylyov, and Senator Igor Chernyshenko, from which he learned that they had ordered and planned to install as many as 90 obelisks in northern Norway in the coming years in memory of the partisans of World War II. He also learned from the letter about their intention to organise regular ‘memory tours’ in the museums of Vardø and search patrols in Finnmark to map the coordinates of the burial sites of Soviet soldiers. As Professor Myklebost discovered, the consul sent this letter to the museums and municipalities of Eastern Finnmark.

In the autumn of 2014, Russian and Norwegian politicians met to discuss Norwegian-Russian cooperation in northern Norway. How surprised they were when, at a press conference following the talks, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that joint military-historical events in northern Norway meant Norway’s support for Russia’s position on Ukraine. “We could not ignore the problem of neo-Nazi tendencies in Europe and Ukraine. Our Norwegian friends are committed to preventing radical, including neo-Nazi, tendencies in Europe. Russia is convinced of the need to stop the emergence of new Bandera, Shukhevich, and Quisling,” said Lavrov.

According to Myklebost, this case was not the only one where Russia used Norway’s willingness to participate in events dedicated to the memory of World War II for its propaganda purposes. “The cooperation that Russia managed to achieve in northern Norway was portrayed on Russian TV as if Norway supposedly supports the Kremlin in the fight against alleged Nazism in Ukraine,” says the professor. Nevertheless, the activities of Russian security forces in northern Norway can be considered successful. In 2015, the Prime Minister of Norway, like many other European leaders, rejected the Kremlin’s invitation to participate in the Victory Day celebrations on Red Square in Moscow. Meanwhile, joint events between Norway and Russia in the north continued.

“Patriotic memory tours” conducted by Russia became popular in Vardø. The number of monuments erected by Russians in Norway increased. According to Myklebost, the Russians even managed to attract Norwegian funding for this activity, “although the dominant viewpoints and symbols associated with military history in the tours remained Russian.” In the spring of 2015, “Shield” organised a banquet and reception, where the mayor of Vardø was present as an honoured guest. A report in the newspaper Murmansk Vestnik stated that northern Norwegian politicians did not share Oslo’s position towards Russia after the annexation of Crimea and that it would be good if the Norwegian government adopted the spirit of cooperation prevalent in the north. Since 2015, Norwegians increasingly participated in the tours, and in 2016, a “Russian-Norwegian expert group” on the history of the partisan movement was created.

This group did not include historians, but it did include FSB veterans Gennady Gurylyov and Sergei Goncharov, as well as Russian officials from Murmansk; Senator Chernyshenko became its chairman. There was only one Norwegian in this Russian-Norwegian group — a lawyer and politician from Vardø named Remi Strand. Chapter four, in which a mysterious ‘Marquis de Carabas’ appears When Russian priests decided to build a chapel near NATO radars, it was Remi Strand who was in contact with them and conveyed their wishes to Norwegian officials. He also participated in historical ‘memory tours’ conducted by Russian security forces. During the celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of East Finnmark by the Red Army, Remi Strand organised a ‘memory tour’ to Norway for children from the Russian military-patriotic youth movement Yunarmiya (the teenagers arrived in military uniform).

Some of my interlocutors believe that Remi is a naive person who is genuinely fascinated by the history of the Russian North, the Pomors, and Norwegian partisans, and that Russian security forces are using him. Others believe that Remi helps Russian officials, fully aware of their true objectives. In Vardø, Remi Strand is a kind of ‘Marquis de Carabas.’ When you walk around the island, no matter which building you look at, you are immediately told that Remi either works there, manages something in it, or leads something – in one way or another, he is directly related to what is being done there. Remi Strand presents himself as a lawyer. In addition to practising law, he is on the board of the Finnmark Labour Party and holds various positions in numerous commercial and non-commercial associations and companies.

Furthermore, Remi Strand is a central figure in the Vardøhus Museum Association, which studies the Pomor heritage. He positions himself as a promoter of Pomor history and actively participates in projects organised by Russians in this role. We meet Remi Strand at the Pomor History Museum in Vardø. I had planned to ask Remi for a meeting a few days later. But when I came to the Pomor History Museum, the employee who sold the ticket handed me a notebook with Strand’s mobile number and said that if a tour of the museum was needed, I could just call him, and he would come and conduct it immediately.

And so it happened. Remi came in 15 minutes: “I always come when I’m called to talk about Russian-Norwegian relations. I love this story.” I introduced myself as a journalist, and Strand began to passionately tell me (there were no more visitors in the museum) about the history of the ‘Russian and Norwegian Pomors’. Unlike many Norwegian historians who claim that it is incorrect to call Norwegians ‘Pomors’, Remi believes it is quite correct. He also calls himself a Pomor.

In general, he believes that ‘everyone who lives in Vardø is a Pomor’ because they live by the sea. Strand explains that the Russian Pomors in the 18th century even invented their own language: a mixture of Russian and Norwegian. Portraying for me a Norwegian Pomor negotiating with a Russian, he says in Russian with a Norwegian accent: ‘Hello, old friend. No, it’s expensive, it needs to be cheaper’. After the tour, Remi suggests a walk to the Orthodox cross that the Russians installed in Vardø in 2011 ‘in memory of Russian people (presumably Pomors or seasonal workers) who died on this land from 1700 to 1920’.

‘Due to their Orthodox faith, they found their final resting place here, not in a cemetery, as they could not be buried in consecrated Lutheran ground,’ reads the inscription on the memorial next to the cross. As soon as I finish reading it, Remi Strand hands me a medal prepared by the FSB veterans’ organisation ‘Shield’ and puts it around my neck. The medal depicts a cross, with inscriptions on the side: ‘Pomor pilgrimage’, ‘Arkhangelsk, Vardø’. At the beginning of 2017, the organisation ‘Shield’ held a three-day festival of patriotic cinema in Vardø and the neighbouring village of Kiberg. The audience was shown two Russian-produced films (prepared using materials from the ‘Shield’ foundation by LLC ‘North-West Broadcasting’) about the ‘joint struggle of Soviet and Norwegian patriots’ against the German Nazis.

Following this event, a report was broadcast on TV21, stating that during the festival, viewers discussed the ‘shame’ associated with the fact that the partisans, ‘who helped the Red Army defeat the Nazis in Finnmark’, were not awarded medals by the Norwegian authorities for their military actions, but were instead declared spies. Soon after, an 840-page book edited by Gennady Gurylyov was published, titled ‘What the fjords are silent about’. It states: ‘Forty-five years of silence about the defeat of the German troops in Finnmark by the Red Army and the liberation of the northern regions [of Norway] have had their effect: the population of the central and southern parts of Norway [during the Cold War] knew absolutely nothing about these important events. Therefore, the restoration of historical justice and truth is an extremely important part of the development of relations between Norway and Russia’. In 2020, Remi Strand negotiated with the Finnmark police to bring a 25-tonne T-34 tank from Russia for the partisan history museum in the neighbouring town of Kiberg, near Vardø, in memory of the liberation of East Finnmark in 1944.

Experts from the University of Tromsø argued at the time that “the T-34 has no connection to partisan operations in Finnmark,” but for Russia, “the display of the T-34 in a Norwegian museum would be a colossal propaganda victory.” Strand’s plan was not realised: the Finnmark county police stated that the project would violate the Norwegian law on the import of firearms. I ask Remi Strand if his trust in his Russian allies has weakened after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. “There is currently a serious debate on this issue in Vardø,” Strand replies. “Our mayor believes that Russian monuments legitimise Russian aggression in Ukraine. However, I think our task is to continue preserving history and memory, and politics should remain separate.

In communication with Russian colleagues, I avoid the topic of the war in Ukraine. We do not talk about politics, we talk about history.” Despite the strained relations between the countries, Strand continues to travel to Russia. This year, he celebrated Victory Day on May 9 in Murmansk, ‘because in Russia this holiday is celebrated more widely than in Norway.’ While in Norway, the liberation from five years of Nazi occupation is celebrated on May 8. Strand was also invited ‘to an informal meeting with friends’ at the city art library, under the cameras of the Vesti TV programme reporters. There, during a discussion on ‘the exceptional importance of preserving historical memory on both sides of the border’, Remi Strand shared his joy with his Russian comrades: ‘Speaking of our town Vardø, the authorities wanted to demolish the partisan monument.

But we, the residents of Vardø, defended this monument. It stands where it stood, in Kiberg, a small village not far from Vardø. “There are no legal restrictions in Norway that would prevent private individuals from communicating or even cooperating with Russia,” says Mayor Labahå. “However, Remi is an elected representative of the Vardø municipality, and in my opinion, from an ethical point of view, he should not maintain such ties. This, of course, could be used by the Russian authorities for their propaganda purposes, as his trips to Russia as an elected official could be presented as a form of legitimacy or political support.” Chapter five, in whichfreedom must be fought for “Russia is trying to increase the sense of distance and distrust between Oslo and northern Norway,” says Mayor Labahå.

“They do this by emphasising that the north is in a state of neglect, Oslo does not care about the local population, and that Russia is a ‘natural partner’ for the region. Their propaganda is dangerous because it exploits real discontent in the north but distorts it to suit Moscow’s political interests. In reality, the Norwegian government and parliament have their own strategy for action in the far north, which is aimed at supporting the growth and development of municipalities in northern Norway.” According to Labahå, although cross-border ‘memory tours’ officially ceased after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, in practice, Russian representatives did not stop spreading propaganda in Norway after that — they just changed the form. “The Russian consulate in Kirkenes continues to sow division in our society, using ceremonies at monuments to Soviet soldiers and various meetings with local residents to influence their opinion,” says the mayor. The chief of police of Finnmark, Ellen Katrine Hætta, confirms to me that since the start of the full-scale war, “delegations of even more impressive sizes than before have started coming to Russian military monuments in Norway with flowers.” However, Hætta does not know exactly who these delegations consist of: “They come to Norway legally, so it is not easy for us to request information about them.” The Finnmark police does not make any attempts to hinder the Russians.

“That’s how democracy works,” Hetta explains. I witnessed this principle myself at the May 9 celebration in Kirkenes this year. The first to come to the monument to Soviet soldiers that morning was a tipsy man named Sergei Korataev. First, he unfurled a Russian flag covered with signatures of Russian soldiers currently fighting in Ukraine. Then he handed me his mobile phone and asked me to record a video of him on it.

None of this attracted any attention from the local residents, and the police was not present at the event at all. Employees of the Russian Consulate General laid flowers and wreaths near the monument. Soon, the Russian Consul General in Kirkenes, Nikolai Konygin, arrived, gave a speech about the decisive role of Soviet soldiers in the liberation of Eastern Finnmark, after which everyone stood under Soviet songs in honour of Victory Day and dispersed. In the 2017 issue of the FSB magazine ‘For and Against’, it states that Norway is ‘almost the only’ NATO country bordering Russia ‘where, alongside the Russian Federation, they truly honour the memory of our Great Patriotic War, of those who defeated fascism’. ‘There are many examples of this: the large number of monuments in Norway, museums, and regular bilateral meetings of various delegations timed to commemorate war dates, usually in May and October,’ writes the article’s author.

As of 2024, Norway ranks first among all UN countries in the democracy index, while Russia is at the very bottom of this list. “Norwegians, with such a high degree of freedom, may find it difficult to understand that the Kremlin subordinates all aspects of what happens in the country to its goals, especially the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church as a government tool,” says Inger Lene Nyttingnes. “This is why the ideas of building an Orthodox chapel and conducting historical ‘memory tours’ initially gained trust and support in the local municipality — we were not prepared for the fact that propaganda could also be conducted through such things. But Russian officials know how to do this. The danger for Norway is this: when small local communities are fed disinformation, it can affect political sentiments within them.

This, in turn, can directly influence the decisions made in the town council. When facts are mixed with interpretation, and conclusions are drawn based on feelings, our local society can become vulnerable. It is important that decisions are made based on critical reflection of historical truths.” In 2023, the Vardø town council annulled its friendship agreement with Arkhangelsk due to the ‘ongoing aggressive war and violations of international law committed by Russia in Ukraine’. In August 2024, Labahå stated that he was in favour of demolishing the monuments to Norwegian partisans erected by Russia, as, looking back, he saw insincerity in its actions. Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused the Norwegian mayor of adhering to Nazi ideology for this.

However, Labahå’s desire to remove the two Russian monuments to partisans was ultimately not realised. In Norway, a mayor cannot decide this alone, and his intention did not receive the necessary support in Finnmark. Despite concerns about the infiltration of Russian propaganda into the field of history, museum staff cannot prohibit Russians from spreading it. But they do everything they can to hinder them. Moreover, museums in Norway are not considered neutral institutions.

“Our duties include spreading democratic values and a high level of reflection,” says Nyttingnes. “We want to ensure that research-based knowledge and reliable facts are the foundation for discussions and decision-making in the local community. We now have knowledge that we did not have ten years ago. In particular, we now see: the motives of the Russian side turned out not to be as good as we believed in 2011. In January 2024, at the historical museum in Vardø, where Nyttingnes works, a discussion was broadcast about the narratives ‘imposed on Norway by Russia’.

In September of the same year, the museum invited history professors Kari Aga Myklebost and Stian Bones to give presentations on their research on this topic. After the scholars’ presentations, a discussion took place in the museum. Not many people watched the broadcast, but about 70 townspeople attended the event with the professors. “It was a good discussion between locals with different views, the mayor, and scholars,” continues Inger Lene. “Democracy is something we must work for, it does not come by itself.

Freedom of speech and the press, the right to choose our leaders, civil rights, the right to love whom you love, the right to education and to create your own identity — these are things that someone once fought for.” Activist Remi Strand ignored both of these events.