Why is Russia building new underwater robots?

This is a reproduction of an article that first appeared on 66° North. If you would like to read more posts by Lukas Wahden, you can sign up for his blog on Substack here.

In early April, the British Ministry of Defence reported that “three Russian submarines [had] conducted a covert operation over cables and pipelines in waters north of the British Isles.” Defence Secretary John Healey told the press that “Russia had sent an Akula class submarine as a diversionary tactic while two of its GUGI spy submarines carried out the surveillance” of critical underwater cables of high importance for the U.K. Following a series of prominent, difficult-to-attribute cable cuts in the Baltic, NATO states have been laser-focused on the threat posed to these crucial pieces of digital infrastructure by vessels from hostile countries, especially Russia

GUGI, the organisation mentioned by Healey, is short for the Russian “Главное управление глубоководных исследований”, or Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research. It is a secretive agency belonging to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Presumably founded in the 1960s, GUGI operates submarines and submersibles for deep sea operations. Its vessels are based in Oleniya Guba on the Kola peninsula, and able to gather intelligence on rival countries’ submarines, work with installations on the seabed, and conduct sabotage operations in remote parts of the deep sea.

GUGI’s flagship vessel, the AS-31 Losharik, is capable of operating at a depth of up to 6,000 meters. Its hull is formed from seven interconnected spherical titanium compartments, which distribute pressure rather than resisting it. GUGI’s battery-powered submersibles, the AS-37 Rus and AS-39 Consul, are also titanium-hulled and can operate at depths of 6,000 meters. They have been deployed in the Arctic to take seafloor samples. Russia has also laid the keel of the new mini-sub “Sergei Bavilin” which, according to sources associated with the Russian Defence Ministry, will be able to dive to 11,000 metres — the approximate depth of some of the deepest ocean trenches

With NATO’s deep sea vessels, such as attack submarines, built for fundamentally different mission purposes, Russia has historically enjoyed an edge over the alliance in targeted deep sea operations. Western military planners fear that Moscow could employ its assets for sabotage operations to cause immense harm to the economies of rival states, or gain leverage by threatening to do so.

Nurlan Aliyev, a Senior Research Fellow at the College of Europe in Natolin, conducts pioneering work on Russia’s research fleet and its robotic maritime capabilities. On March 26, Aliyev published an essay on Russia’s expanding robotic sea capabilities with the Center for Maritime Strategy, which is an extract of his upcoming book on Russian Arctic strategy.

In the article, Aliyev argues that Russia is supplementing its legacy GUGI assets by integrating unmanned surface and underwater robotic systems into its wider maritime strategy. Moscow hopes to achieve asymmetric maritime dominance over NATO through a blend of offensive, defensive, and dual-use applications, particularly in the Arctic and North Atlantic. Alongside Cold War-era GUGI assets, Russia already deploys a newer, more diverse portfolio of platforms for reconnaissance, seabed mapping, and sabotage, including the “Harmony” underwater sensor network.

In an interview given to 66° North, Aliyev stressed that Russia’s growing investment in maritime robotics addresses both economic and security requirements. Robotic systems allow Russia to survey the seabed for resource-extraction purposes and maritime claims; maintain underwater communication lines; and support shipping and transport along Arctic sea routes and major river systems. These tasks are complicated by harsh weather conditions, vast distances, and persistent shortages of skilled personnel.

In this sense, the robotisation of Russia’s underwater assets is a practical adaptation to the requirements of key Russian waters, especially in the Arctic, with the added benefit of fitting into Moscow’s preference for advanced technologies that can be repurposed for military aims if needed.

This inherent dual-use nature of robotic underwater technologies is also what makes them consequential for maritime strategy. Systems designed for civilian purposes — such as environmental monitoring, pipeline inspection, debris removal, or offshore energy work — can be repurposed for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, or sabotage. Military organisations like GUGI will increasingly also incorporate robotic systems simply because many modern underwater operations will become impossible without them.

The implications of Aliyev’s findings are straightforward. While Russian underwater capabilities are already posing a strategic challenge to NATO, the addition of robotic and unmanned capabilities may make attribution, deterrence and the protection of said infrastructure even more difficult in the years ahead. And while the potential military uses of new capabilities are evident, their development as civilian tools will continue to make straightforward categorisation — as well as targeted responses — difficult to achieve.

Any opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arctic Today.

Lukas Wahden is a PhD candidate in International Relations at SciencesPo Paris and Associate Fellow with the Russia Program at George Washington University. He mostly writes about Russia, the poles, oceans and space.