Russia’s Arctic hybrid war is working, the US is pulling back
The Trump administration’s withdrawal from key multilateral cyber and hybrid warfare security bodies reflects a broader retrenchment from cooperative security frameworks at a time when hybrid warfare is emerging as a defining feature of contemporary conflict, particularly in the strategic competition between Russia and the West.
As the administration withdraws from agencies such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (CoE), part of its wider withdrawal, on January 7, from 66 agreements, they form part of a broader pattern of U.S. disengagement from multilateral institutions. As a result, even if the United States continues a diminished cyber and security cooperation, the reduced coordination risks weakening intelligence-sharing and joint response capabilities between NATO and its allies. Without such coordination, hybrid warfare — whether domestic or transnational, as Russia and China are waging against global democracies at large — cannot be effectively countered.
Operating in the “grey zone,” the space between war and peace, hybrid warfare blends cyber operations, information campaigns, economic pressure, legal maneuvering, and covert activity into a coordinated strategy designed to achieve political objectives while avoiding kinetic military action. Hybrid warfare is continuous and coordinated rather than a series of unconnected episodic actions. Russia has chosen, with the advent of cyber and other technologies, to wage its Hybrid War on the West while operating below NATO’s Article 5 threshold for collective self-defense.
Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics exploit structural vulnerabilities and gaps within and among the allied states. Open media systems, democratic governance, interconnected infrastructure, the use of legal processes, even political disagreements, constitute democracies’ strengths, but that openness also creates multiple entry points for political manipulation and coercion. Through disinformation, cyber intrusions, economic coercion, covert disruption and the strategic use of international law, lawfare, Russia’s aim is the gradual erosion of political cohesion, institutional trust, and decision-making capabilities to advance its own geopolitical objectives.
The practice is particularly evident in Northern Europe and the Arctic, where Russia’s hybrid warfare activity affects both security and sovereignty under domestic and international law. Cyber operations are central to this form of warfare. Moscow and private actors have targeted government institutions, research networks, and critical infrastructure, conducting operations that range from espionage to disruptive attacks on energy systems and public infrastructure. Even when physical impacts are limited, Russia’s strategic effectiveness lies in exposing vulnerabilities and undermining confidence in state governments.
Electromagnetic interference has become a consequential tool. In March 2026, Norwegian authorities reported a marked escalation in GPS interference along the northern border, with disruptions detected at airports, during takeoff and landing, and at sea. Government officials in Finnmark described the situation as “serious,” noting that satellite navigation degradation directly affects civilian aviation and emergency response capabilities. Maritime navigation in Arctic and sub-Arctic waters has also been impacted by cyber operations, increasing risk where margins for error are narrow. What was once episodic disruption has become a recurring operating condition across parts of the High North.
Hybrid attacks also include physical sabotage and covert activity. Damage to European subsea cables, unexplained maritime incidents, and vessels operating with ambiguous ownership or disguised identity reflect a pattern of deniable operations. The Arctic amplifies these dynamics. As sea-ice retreat expands access to the northern sea routes and resources, the region has become a strategic frontier characterized by vast distances, limited infrastructure, and sparse surveillance. These conditions enable hybrid warfare tactics with reduced risk of detection or rapid response.
While Russia’s hybrid war has been waged in the Baltic, the Black Sea and South China Sea, it is increasingly visible in the Arctic, governed by a combination of international and domestic law and procedural mechanisms such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The goal of hybrid warfare is to reshape geopolitical realities without overt legal violation. Russia has advanced expansive and self-serving interpretations of international maritime law, reinforced by domestic regulatory measures, to consolidate control over key waterways such as the Northern Sea Route. Through permitting systems, routing controls, and administrative requirements, Moscow has effectively transformed waters considered international into a regulated corridor under Russian jurisdiction.
Attacks on Finland and Norway illustrate how Russia’s hybrid warfare adapts. Both nations have reported increased electronic interference linked to Russian activity on the Kola Peninsula, alongside growing concern over vulnerabilities of offshore energy infrastructure and subsea communication networks. Finland, following its accession to NATO, has faced intensified cyber probing and disinformation attempting to shape domestic perceptions about NATO and Arctic security policy.
What distinguishes hybrid warfare in Europe and the Arctic is its cumulative effect. Individually, incidents may appear limited; collectively, they form a sustained campaign to erode stability, test resilience, and redefine the practical boundaries of sovereignty. Democracies, because of their openness, remain particularly exposed to this form of coercion.
In this context, U.S. withdrawal from multilateral cyber and hybrid security frameworks carries consequences that extend beyond institutional realignment. Hybrid threats, often transnational and multidomain, require coordinated responses across allied governments, legal systems, and operational commands. When coordination weakens, the ability to operate with sovereign authority is diminished, as the allied governments depend upon cooperation and legal process.
Hybrid warfare reflects a transformation of the nature of conflict, elevating ambiguity, coercion and multidimensional pressure over conventional military confrontation aimed at reshaping the international rules-based order. The challenge for NATO and the West is to recognize, mitigate and counter these dynamics before the cumulative impact becomes decisive.
Anita Parlow is a legal scholar and author specialising in Arctic governance, Indigenous rights, and climate-related security issues. Her previous work includes co-editing Climate and Conflict, published articles on Arctic and Greenland for Norwegian and Alaskan publications, and two Wilson Center reports: IMO Polar Code for the Polar Program, and Hybrid War for the Kennan Institute.
