Norway’s security service warns civilian ships are being used to spy on its coast

Norway’s Police Security Service (PST) says foreign states are using civilian vessels to gather intelligence along the Norwegian coast and could use them to prepare sabotage. In an article published Oct. 1, the agency called the coast a persistent intelligence target because of its length, its proximity to the High North and the Arctic, and its shipping lanes and resources.

Russian intelligence services have closely monitored Norwegian and allied military activity in Norway for years, PST said. They seek information on coastal infrastructure, technology and activity to identify vulnerabilities.

PST calls the practice covert maritime intelligence activity, known by its Norwegian acronym MFEA. A research vessel can serve as cover for mapping critical infrastructure along the coast and on the seabed. A fishing boat can carry intelligence officers posing as fishermen into Norwegian ports.

The same vessels can prepare sabotage operations and potentially help carry them out, the agency warned. They can also stage incidents at sea to test Norway’s preparedness, and what they learn about the response can later feed intelligence, influence and sabotage operations.

Russian crews on foreign-flagged ships

Russian vessels are barred from mainland Norwegian ports except Kirkenes, Båtsfjord and Tromsø, where access is strictly limited. PST said Russia can get around these restrictions by placing Russian crews aboard civilian vessels registered in other countries, which it assesses as a threat.

Third-country vessels with access to Norwegian ports can also be used to smuggle goods subject to sanctions or export controls, the agency said.

China and strategic investment

PST also warned of economic tools that threaten security, such as buying property near protected infrastructure or investing in buildings and ports. It pointed to reports in 2024 that a Chinese actor was interested in developing the port of Kirkenes into an Arctic transport hub.

The agency has highlighted China’s growing intelligence threat and its push to control supply chains and position itself in the Arctic. Foreign involvement in logistics infrastructure enables a long-term presence that makes it easier to extract information from Norwegian authorities and put pressure on them, PST said.

Public asked to report

“We are tasked with both uncovering and countering MFEA. To do that, we depend entirely on working with others who have eyes and ears at sea that we don’t have,” said Inger Haugland, head of PST’s department for state threat actors.

She listed unusual meetings between vessels at sea, abnormal equipment on board, discrepancies in crew lists, and vessels near Norwegian or allied military exercises as signs worth reporting.