Don’t let political drama about Greenland distract from Svalbard
While Greenland grabs the headlines, it could be argued that a bigger story is playing out on an Arctic archipelago 2,000 kilometers away: Svalbard.
Located midway between the North Pole and Norway, Svalbard has been under Norwegian ownership for more than a century. However, the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 gave Russians (among others) the right to live and conduct business there. It also mandated the demilitarization of Svalbard, preventing NATO from building military bases.
Russia is now attempting to exert more influence over Svalbard against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical tension in the Arctic region.
How is Moscow increasing its influence?
Russia’s links to Svalbard run deep. The Pomors, a Russian ethnic enclave from the present-day Republic of Karelia, occupied lands around the White Sea in the 15th and 16th centuries. The Soviets claimed they were the original settlers of Svalbard, which they called Grumant. (This claim hasn’t been substantiated and the Dutchman Willem Barentsz is widely credited with discovering the archipelago).
Russia continues to use the narrative to justify its presence on the islands and to push for more control. Last year, Russian politician Sergey Mironov even proposed that Svalbard be renamed “Pomors Islands.”
The first industry to be established in Svalbard was whaling in the early 1700s. Later that century, hunters and whale hunters discovered coal deposits, though commercial mining didn’t begin until around 1900. Numerous mines were soon dotting around the island.
Given their cultural significance, the rights to mine and fish were enshrined in the Svalbard Treaty.
These days, Svalbard’s only active mine is at Barentsburg, the second-largest settlement on the archipelago. The town is heavily subsidized by Moscow and most of its inhabitants are Russian nationals.
In August 2023, a seven-meter-tall orthodox cross was erected in the nearby town of Pyramiden. The unauthorized sculpture was later removed. Even today, Barentsburg appreciates its soviet provenance, with a sign that reads “Наш цель — коммунизм” (“Our goal – communism”).
According to Professor Kari Aga Myklebost of the University of Tromsø, such iconic structures are declarations that the Russian settlements on Svalbard are holy lands and belong to the Russian cultural and spiritual sphere.
The Russian Orthodox Church plays an important role on Svalbard. Under the Kremlin’s aegis, Archbishop Kirill of Moscow — a senior member of the clergy and close ally of Vladimir Putin — has expanded his “spiritual presence” beyond Russia’s frontiers. In 2012, he appointed Bishop Iakov as his representative in the Arctic and since then, the bishop has made multiple attempts to assert Russian ownership of the region. He is known to bypass customs at Longyearbyen, arriving instead at Barentsburg, where he leads his flock in both spiritual and patriotic remembrance.
After the cross in Pyramiden was erected, Bishop Iakov installed a similar monument on Franz Josef Land — a Russian territory just east of Svalbard — with the local military to lend an air of authenticity. His visits to Svalbard have drawn attention for another reason: they have reportedly coincided with those by King Harald V of Norway, which could be seen as a display of equivalence.
In parallel, Arktikugol (the company that operates the mine at Barentsburg) has started running cruises along the Murmansk–Barentsburg route. By upgrading infrastructure and connectivity at Pyramiden and Barentsburg, it hopes to revive Svalbard’s economy.
Previously, Russian tourists to Svalbard had to travel to Norway, either by air or over land. To enter mainland Norway, they need to obtain a visa — something that has become increasingly difficult since the invasion of Ukraine. To overcome these restrictions, Russia transports its citizens to Svalbard by boat, which goes against the spirit of the 1920 treaty.
Drawing on these levers, Russia has maintained a strong presence on Svalbard. It supports the population at Barentsburg and plans to reinvigorate other communities. To the east of Svalbard is the heavily militarized Kola Peninsula with facilities that could potentially be used in ways that would be detrimental to allied interests.
What is behind Moscow’s strategy?
Russia’s Northern Fleet has access to the largest nuclear stockpile in the world. Its main base is at Severomorsk, a town on the coast of the Barents Sea that is used by multitude of nuclear and conventionally powered submarines and icebreakers.
Russia uses its maritime forces to project power into the Arctic and to oversee the North Sea Route (NSR), a lifeline to the Russian export economy.
Freedom of operation in the Barents and Norwegian Seas is crucial to Russian objectives. Svalbard straddles the two bodies of water and serves as a chokepoint for Russia’s movement into the Atlantic. The archipelago’s strategic location makes it a prime target for Russian coercion and usurpation.
The NSR is a trade corridor across the Eurasian Arctic, running from the Barents to the Bering Seas. It lies entirely within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and exports transported via that route account for around 8% of Russia’s GDP. The tankers invariably deliver goods to China and India, two of Russia’s biggest importers. As global warming reshapes maritime shipping, Russia is likely to use the NSR to control a significant share of trade between Europe and Asia.
Despite international sanctions, operations along the NSR haven’t diminished. Russia has de facto authority in the north-central and eastern parts of the Eurasian Arctic, which means there is little the U.S. or its allies can do to intervene. The fact that only a small amount of U.S. Navy freedom-of-navigation operations are conducted in the region is indicative of that.
In contrast, NATO bases around the GIUK-N Gap (Greenland, Iceland, the U.K., and Norway) project considerable power in the region and deter against aggressive Russian naval or submarine activities. The addition of the Combined Air Operations at Bodø and the Arctic Sentry at Nuuk further strengthens allied capabilities.
Russia will attempt to pose a comparable threat, and the Bear Gap might be their answer. Moscow has the necessary forces at Murmansk and Franz Josef Land. By isolating the community on the island — for example, by damaging its underwater data cables — it could gain traction for its vision for the Pomor Islands. If successful, Russia could then blockade the waters south and west of Svalbard, effectively denying access to its entire Arctic Extended Continental Shelf.
What can NATO do to counter this?
The treaty that enables Russia to increase its influence over Svalbard also hampers NATO’s ability to take countermeasures. The alliance cannot install defensive forces on the island as a deterrent because it would violate the terms of the Svalbard Treaty.
It can, however, surveil and protect assets crucial to Svalbard’s connectivity to the mainland. Norway should regulate vessels that skirt environmental standards set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It is a contentious proposition, as signaled by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s decision not to seize vessels that violate such rules.
Dissolving this agreement is a political non-starter. Svalbard has a history of international commingling, and the action would result in a significant backlash from Russia and some non-Arctic observer nations. Furthermore, terminating the treaty could disturb the delicate arrangement that has helped to maintain peace in the region.
NATO can defend its autonomy on Svalbard by actively enforcing customs and environmental measures. The Norwegian Coast Guard patrols and regulates the EEZ around Svalbard.
When operating outside territorial waters, the Coast Guard should ensure that international transit is limited to Longyearbyen. Customs would remain cursory and unbiased. The transparency would allow Norway to inspect the flow of personnel and ensure compliance with the treaty.
The non-discrimination clause allows Norway to take measures to protect the environment. Similarly, Norway is empowered to police the population on Svalbard. Lars Fause, the governor of the archipelago, should use these levers to promote safety and sovereignty within the treaty’s framework. Harmful and overtly nationalistic rhetoric, intransparent professional conduct, and mining-induced environmental degradation are all grounds for regulatory intervention.
Finally, intensifying geopolitical tensions are increasing the pressure on NATO to bolster its Arctic defenses. Russia operates multiple bases around Svalbard and, despite the war in Ukraine, is replenishing them. The Kremlin has also revived a nuclear test site on Novaya Zemlya an archipelago in northern Russia.
Under such pressures, NATO has the technical means to protect the Arctic. But do its members have the resolve to act decisively – and if the intelligence warrants it, preemptively – even if that means violating the terms of the Svalbard Treaty
Yash Desai is a graduate student of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, D.C. His research focuses on Arctic geopolitics, with particular interests in multilateral defense initiatives, energy security, and rules-based regional governance. You can find more of his analysis on Substack.
