Collaboration, not exceptionalism, is the key to Arctic peace

The exceptionalism that once defined Arctic governance has faltered in this geopolitical era of “might makes right.”

Once a key feature among Arctic nations, the region’s unique and stable “zone of peace” led to greater cooperation and collaboration on everything from security and defence to environmental stewardship and scientific exploration, rather than traditional narratives of competition and rivalries.

Despite Russia’s reopening of Soviet‑era bases in 2005, planting a flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007, and invading Ukraine in 2022, some still claim the Arctic remains a zone of peace. Yet proposals by U.S. President Donald Trump to annex Greenland or absorb Canada, combined with a growing Sino‑Russian challenge to traditional sovereignty, make clear that Arctic exceptionalism has effectively ended.

The new geopolitical reality is that the region will undoubtedly see more instances of traditional hard power returning to the fold. There will also be further erosion of local and Indigenous rights; representation and interests; and alternative perspectives for how the Arctic should be governed – whether it be a more Sino-Russian belief for non-western rules, norms and authority, or a Trumpian-perspective that’s fixated on territorial expansion and ownership.

With greater power asymmetry in the Arctic, more instances of unpredictability and instability are likely to emerge. That would impact the peoples and normative structures that have traditionally made the Arctic a peaceful region.

Yet there is a silver lining in this precarious moment. The Arctic is, and has the potential to remain, a resilient region. As demonstrated by NATO allies sending troops to Greenland and the European Union’s resolve to not back down in supporting Greenlandic sovereignty, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden must dare to act together to influence and shape the region’s geopolitical discourse on values, rules and authority.

But where to start? The first agenda item for the Arctic Six (A6) is to inaugurate a genuine coalition united behind a shared vision on Arctic governance. Priorities should include collective defence, the rule of law, and values on territorial integrity, sovereignty, and autonomy. To advance and attain these principles in a potentially more anarchic Arctic, the A6 will need to focus on three defining areas: hard security, local security, and strategic diplomacy.

On hard security, the A6 should prioritize greater collective resolve to counter, disrupt, and prohibit any adversary and ally from initiating conventional, unconventional, or informational threats. While the A6 have existing defence collaborations – for many within NATO and Canada with NORAD – both organizations lack a unified Arctic deterrence strategy.

With a more fragmented posture, consisting of a collection of national strategies rather than a collective defence posture, the A6 must build a coherent coalition-level defence concept for the Arctic. To unite and synchronize their defence and security frameworks, it will be imperative for the A6 to establish a joint Arctic Command.

By reflecting the region’s rising strategic weight and the military resolve needed to defend their shared geopolitical interests, an A6 joint Arctic Command will provide more ingrained and interconnected operational lines of effort, while also providing more direct control over military planning and response operations.

Collaboration on hard security should also expand intelligence-sharing agreements among the A6. Many of the A6 have intelligence-sharing agreements with the U.S., through bilateral or multilateral organizations like Five Eyes and NATO. A distinct A6 intelligence-sharing pact would seek to overcome intelligence-sharing shortcomings by preserving the role of intelligence gathering and analysis among their militaries, intelligence services, bureaucracies, and Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Public Safety.

In having more intelligence-sharing capacity, independent of the U.S. which at this time do not align with the coalition’s geopolitical interest, the A6 will be better off at integrating first-hand logistical, military, and operational intelligence on the region’s strategic landscape to anticipate, respond, and monitor conventional armed threats, maritime safety operations, and prevailing grey-zone threats.

For local security, perhaps the area most underdeveloped among the A6, attention must be placed towards pinpointing and resolving soft security issues impacting local and Indigenous communities. These range from food insecurity, critical infrastructure, economic opportunity, cultural preservation, health, and education – impacting local and Indigenous communities.

Here, the A6 must hone their resources to properly invest, plan, and implement strategies to lift these communities out of hardship. That would deny adversaries a narrative opening to exploit communities who do not feel represented in decision-making or who are at risk of greater impoverishment.

To be successful in this endeavour, the A6 must attain the consent and involvement of local governments and Indigenous bands, nations, and communities to ensure transparency and longevity of the coalition’s security efforts. If neglected, adversaries could manipulate local politics, stoke divisions among Indigenous communities, and interfere economically, politically, or militarily.

Lastly, the A6 needs to collectively organize a united vision around strategic diplomacy to advance the coalition’s regional interests as well as manage complex relations.

This should not equate to simple political conversations or fall purely on ceremonial exchanges. Instead, the A6 will need to use strategic diplomacy as a tool for shaping outcomes and agendas of Arctic governance by contextualizing geopolitical policies and actions in the Arctic by adversaries and like-minded non-Arctic partners alike.

To shape and manage intra-alliance cohesion on sovereignty, autonomy and the rule of law, as well as constrain adversarial strategies to wedge, manipulate, and coordinate against the A6, the coalition will need to use strategic diplomacy to align threat perceptions and clarify red lines to better govern the region with rules and arrangements designed purposely to uphold normative notions central to their geopolitical interest. While some may argue for using the Arctic Council, it is important to keep in mind that the institution was not designed to handle realist and Hobbesian geopolitical actions.

Prior to 2026, the train of thought for Arctic security was “peace through values.” Post 2026, the prevailing thought will be “peace through strength.” For this to be credible, the A6 must accept that Arctic exceptionalism is gone. In its place, a coalition of like-minded Arctic nations must secure stability, sovereignty, and autonomy by daring to collaborate on efforts that will upend traditional notions of Arctic governance.

Andrew Erskine is a research fellow at the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy, a Nonresident Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a Fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network.