In Arctic security conversations, there’s a clear change in tone and focus

Military, government and business representatives from across the Arctic gathered for a two-day conference in Stockholm in July. The tone and focus have clearly shifted from past regional security conferences. The conversations were held with a greater sense of urgency. The speakers were almost exclusively military or industry, addressing defense tactical maneuvering and strategy.

I ran into one of our regular Arctic Today contributors, Anita Parlow, and we compared notes. What follows are our joint reflections on conversations on the stage and in the hallways. Chatham House rules apply, so we will not quote or name anyone directly in this commentary.

• The conference presentations reflected a broad range of concerns, including the impact of climate change and geo-strategic rivalries on land, sea and air, altering access, governance, and stability in the Arctic. Two topics — space and communications — dominated.
• The new, new buzzword was ”sovereignty.” In just two days, the word was used more than a dozen times on stage. Yet, questions during the breaks about what sovereignty means in this context were met with vague and unaligned responses. Perhaps as the U.S. rattles NATO, members want to show their commitment but also ensure they have strength independently, just in case. Also, Russia’s approach to the maritime Arctic is designed to increasingly replace international waters and territorial waters with sustained Russian presence and claims of sovereignty.
• Environment and the elements: Many discussions reminded the room of stark reality — that the Arctic is pitch dark half the year, the permafrost is thawing, ice is melting, distances are enormous, access to fuel and energy is challenging, and infrastructure is near non-existent. Solutions from the south won’t make it in the North. So what will? Industry and military demonstrations explored resilient solutions.
• Greenland wasn’t mentioned until midmorning on the second day. Also, the planned speakers from the U.S. both cancelled last minute. NATO, Canada and Sweden dominated the conversation, with a spattering of Denmark and Norway.

Cold War logic

• Several discussions reflected upon Cold War logic, with the North Atlantic framed as a zone of concern for Russia because of second-strike nuclear deterrence and evolving military operations in the Arctic. Several also said that security depends on understanding the environment itself, as ships and troops must be built around conditions that can quickly overwhelm otherwise conventional assumptions.
• Russia’s war in Ukraine was treated as a lesson learned: that deterrence must reflect the reality of Putin, who tends to exploit weak points. The discussion included mention of defense for actions below NATO Article 5, along with stockpiling, production capacity, dual-use technologies, and closer government-industry coordination to prevent penetration and protect capabilities.
• One speaker pointed out that solutions for survival and dominance demand simplicity, backup systems, and reliable supply chains. That’s because in the Arctic, the practical challenge is not just building capability, but keeping it running when things fail.
• Remarks in another panel discussion pointed to a more contested and more practical Arctic, where procurement, industrial capacity, and defense planning matter as much as formal strategy. They linked the region’s changing conditions to the limits of Arctic exceptionalism, arguing that earlier patterns of cooperation have given way to a sharper security dilemma and a new set of state objectives in the region.

Space’s increasing importance

• Space turned up as an increasingly exposed and essential layer of Arctic security. Unprecedented geopolitical shifts, dual-use pressures, and rising uncertainty require structural responses built around autonomy, connectivity, collective security, and trust, because space is the invisible backbone linking economy, security, and diplomacy.
• Discussion of multi-domain European resilience depends on secure communications and a clear choice about what degree of interoperability and scale is actually needed for government and allied use. Core point: The tradeoff is that greater connectivity improves coordination, but it also increases vulnerability, so the system must be designed with layered security, strict access controls, and resilience against failure or compromise.
• Governments need to encourage dual-purpose industry capability in production. Procurement processes need to move faster and more efficiently. There was a call for more burden sharing through procurement and partnerships to move faster on system changes.
• NATO’s approach to space has shifted from viewing it as a relatively safe domain to treating it as a contested operational environment tied to maritime, land, cyber, and space threats. The NATO Space Centre of Excellence, with France as framework nation from 2021 to 2023, reflected that shift by supporting space domain awareness, coordination of space operations, and integration with broader military strategy, including the role of Space Command at Ramstein.

‘Speed of relevance’

• In space, commercial systems such as Starlink, NorthLink SATCOM, and broader industry capabilities are moving faster than NATO procurement, so the framework must adapt to commercial integration rather than wait for slower institutional cycles. The operational need is that NATO must be able to contract, integrate, and respond at the “speed of relevance,” a recurring phrase.
• The seabed and subsurface is becoming a parallel arena of strategic competition, an asymmetry for dominance tied to the opening of the Northern Route, new sea routes, and new competition. As one speaker noted, “underwater we’re basically blind.”
• Although Russia was not present, its shadow loomed large as speakers reminded the audience about Russia’s shadow fleet activities, arms buildup and activity in the Kola Peninsula, which remains the world’s largest concentration of nuclear and fleet.
• The Canadian Coast Guard’s shift toward national defense reflects that maritime security is changing in practice. NATO defense planning and long-term below-threshold activity pointed to the need for an alliance framework that can handle sovereignty.  The Canadian held many presentations and stressed their focus, their presence and their commitment to the Arctic.
• The challenge is how to manage information across a 6,000-day tracking horizon by combining sensor data, intelligence, and a clearer understanding of what is in the waters and what to do about it. That requires partnership because adaptation and acceleration depend on processes that can coordinate ambitions in real time, focus on today rather than 2035, and respond to a competitive environment in which resources, and continental shelf arguments, are again central.

The conference was in Stockholm, arranged by Defence IQ.

Anita Parlow is a legal scholar and author specialising in Arctic governance, Indigenous rights, and climate-related security issues. Her previous work includes co-editing Climate and Conflict, published articles on Arctic and Greenland for Norwegian and Alaskan publications, and two Wilson Center reports: IMO Polar Code for the Polar Program, and Hybrid War for the Kennan Institute.

Marybeth Sandell is the editor-in-chief of Arctic Today.